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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary 
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting edge research on Irregular 
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) 
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars 
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array 
of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part 
of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by 
world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles and 
books. Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and 
adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to 
meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. 
Col. John D. Waghelstein (Ret.) is the author of this case study, 
which examines ways of recognizing an insurgency while it is still in its 
early stages. This case looks at the strategic and operational effects of 
interagency friction, intelligence assessments, and how to recognize the 
nature of the conflict. It includes a framework for analyzing insurgencies 
at their earliest stages; it also provides a set of benchmarks that have 
helped operators to better understand their environment. The framework is 
not meant to be conclusive; rather, it is a set of questions to help current 
operators consider when and whether an organized rebellion is forming. 
The case also raises the issue of what other indicators we should be aware 
of in a 21st century, social media world.  
It is also important to note four critical caveats to this case study. 
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author 
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 
War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to 
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible 
for the content of this case study. Third, this is a methodology for 




recognizing an insurgency and is just one approach. There are others and it 
is up to the student—the practitioners and operators—to adapt this 
framework and others to suit their environment and conditions. And 
fourth, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are 
written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics including 
strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as ethical and moral 
questions confronted by operators in the battlefield.  The point is to make 
these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills 
the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 
world and to show them the dilemmas that real people faced in high-
pressure situations.   
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are 
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students 
conducting research on Honduras and Latin America will probably find 
the extensive bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the 
case study author and by CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College, 
the bibliography is a selection of the best books and articles on a range of 
related topics. We hope you find it useful and look forward to hearing 
your feedback on the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to 
the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the 
Naval War College. 
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Acronyms and Terms 
AOH: Honduran Army 
CBI: Caribbean Basin Initiative 
CONUS: Contiguous United States 
CREM: Regional Training Center (Centro Regional de Entrenamiento 
Militar) 
DR: Dominican Republic 
ESAF: Armed Forces of El Salvador (Fuerza Armada de El Salvador) 
ESF: Economic Support Funds 
FAST: Forward Area Support Team 
FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo 
Martí de Liberación Nacional) 
FOB: Forward Operating Base 
FSLN: Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional) 
GOH: Government of Honduras 
Good Neighbor Policy: The Good Neighbor Policy was first introduced by 
President Franklin Roosevelt and dealt with U.S.-Latin American 
relations. The policy pledged non-interference in the domestic 
affairs by the U.S. and looked to increase mutual trade 
relationships.  
JTF: Joint Task Force 
JTF-B: Joint Task Force Bravo 
Monroe Doctrine: A policy outlined in President James Monroe’s 7th 
State of the Union Address in 1823. In his speech, Monroe 
declared that the Americas should be free of all influence from 
Europe—any further efforts on the part of Europe at colonizing the 
Americas would be seen as a provocation and would see retaliation 
from the United States.  
MPLC: Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement, aka Cinchoneros 




MTT: Mobile Training Team 
ODA: Operation Detachment Alpha 
PCH: Communist Party of Honduras 
PRTCH: Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers of Honduras 
Roosevelt Corollary: Enacted in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt, 
this policy was a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine. It put forth 
the idea that the United States should assume responsibility for 
enforcing good behavior in South America, and thus prevent any 
intrusion by outside powers.  
RSOI: Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration 
SAF: Special Action Force (8th Special Forces Group [Airborne], Special 
Action Force, Latin America) 
SCIF: Secure/Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
SFG: Special Forces Group 
SFGA: Special Forces Group Airborne 
SFOD A/B: Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha/Bravo 
SOT-A: Special Operations Team—Alpha 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
USEMB: United States Embassy 
















In the early hours of July 4, 1982, buildings in the Honduran 
capital of Tegucigalpa shook with a bomb blast that rattled the windows 
and turned off the lights. Such acts were not uncommon over the border in 
El Salvador, but were shocking in Honduras. The newly elected 
government of Suazo Cordova, the first civilian leader after a decade of 
military rule, had just been served notice that the civil war in El Salvador 
between the ruling military government and the leftist insurgents (the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN) had spread to 
Honduras. According to the communiqué the bombers issued that night, 
the act had been carried out by Salvadoran guerrillas in retaliation for 
Honduran army counterguerrilla operations against them in the disputed, 
demilitarized, border region between the two countries. This region, the 
bolsones, resulted from the so-called Soccer War of 1969 and had become 
safe havens for the El Salvadoran insurgents. 
The guerrillas escalated their activities in the Honduran city of San 
Pedro Sula on September 17, 1982 by seizing the Chamber of Commerce 
and holding 80 members hostage for eight days. Their demands included 
the immediate release of a Salvadoran insurgent held by the Hondurans 
and the expulsion of all foreign advisors.  
The hostages were eventually released and the guerrillas’ demands 
ignored. The hostage takers were flown to Cuba via Panama. Taking 
hostages had been the hallmark of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in their 
successful 12-year war against the Somoza regime (1967–1979), and now 
Honduras was getting a taste. The ugly war in El Salvador had spilled over 
to Honduras. Or had it? The questions that were raised in response to these 
incidents varied widely between different officials. Was Honduras really 
next, or was this merely spillover from the chaos of the region? 
In 1980, a Honduran Committee for Solidarity with the Struggle 
for Central American Peoples had been organized, which enlisted support 




for the El Salvadoran FMLN and established liaison for aid from 
communist Nicaragua. The Revolutionary Party of Central American 
Workers of Honduras (PRTCH) and several other small revolutionary 
groups joined the PCH coalition in 1982. One such group that would be 
heard from was the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (MPLC) or 
“Cinchoneros.” 
For nearly 18 months there was silence from the guerillas and then 
it began. Reports of attacks on the Honduran Supreme Court building, 
police stations, a military school, and the Salvadoran consulate filtered in. 
What was really going on? Why weren’t these reports taken seriously and 
acted upon? What were we missing? For nearly three years a budding 
insurgency had been incubating in plain view, but various factors 
precluded a formal recognition of it or an effective response. Lacking a 
means of identifying trigger points of insurgency, the powers that be were 
mostly oblivious to impending threats. The situation required a fresh and 
experienced observer to assess what was happening, and a matrix by 
which to evaluate those threats. 
 
 
Honduras was my last insurgency.  
In the preceding 26 years, I had participated in operations in 
Vietnam and South East Asia, the Cuban missile crisis, Panama, the 
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and El Salvador. Pretty much anywhere 
there was an insurgency, I had seen some aspect of it. 
My involvement in Honduras came with assuming command of the 
7th Special Forces Group (SFG) in the spring of 1985. The group’s beat 
was all of Latin America and the Caribbean. At that time, the situation in 
Honduras did not look like much of an insurgency and 7th SFG’s focus 
was elsewhere: El Salvador and Nicaragua. The ongoing war in El 
Salvador got a sizable amount of the 7th’s attention, and all those Russian-
made tanks and other stuff that had been provided to the new Marxist 




government in Managua, Nicaragua got the rest. Honduras was an 
afterthought. The 7th SFG’s mandate did include backstopping the army 
of Honduras (AOH) with training and advice and implementing war plans 
should the Nicaraguans decide to invade their neighbor. But our focus was 
Honduras’s neighbors, and this was essentially a conventional role, with 
little concern for our rear. 
My initial assessment was that an internal threat by some sort of 
insurgents or at least rebels seemed to be active in Honduras. The question 
was who, how, and why? 
All this changed, however, over the several months I visited 
Honduras in spring 1985. As I read the reports—cable traffic, mostly—I 
became suspicious that something more sinister might be brewing. An 
attack here, an incident there, a person targeted, and propaganda targeting 
the government and later targeting us. It all seemed more than random acts 
of violence; it looked organized. An old framework from my Vietnam 
counterinsurgency days helped pose the right assessment questions. Some 
of those questions were: Was there evidence of subversive (and/or 
Communist) groups operating within the country or receiving external 
assistance? Was there increasing provocation to force governmental 
response? Were local officials being kidnapped or killed? 
Complicating matters, my concerns were dismissed by the U.S. 
Embassy, Southern Command, and the Honduran Army. At this point, 
almost three years after the initial attacks, the almost universal response 
was “we killed all the guerrillas in ‘82 and ’83.” The Honduran police 
entity (FUSEP) was much less dismissive, but they were thin on the 
ground and 7th SFG was proscribed from dealing directly with them 
because of post-Vietnam legislation. 
So the question became: Was there really an insurgency festering 
in Honduras? If so, what evidence did we have, and how could we 
persuade others to our point of view?  




Having (mis?)spent most of my career in the counterinsurgency 
arena, I knew that the typical “gringo” way of direct confrontation was not 
going to get anywhere, so I opted for a more subtle approach: I altered 7th 
SFG deployments to Honduras from one massive annual surge operation 
to a series of deployments involving fewer teams but having a constant 
presence.  
Instead of sending the Group HQ and two battalions for a few 
weeks, we put four to six operational detachments alpha (ODAs) and a B 
detachment on a continuous rotation. I directed these teams to report 
whatever they saw, paying particular attention to what was going on in 
Honduras on the ground. Their job was to read the tea leaves and figure 
out whether there was any merit to our suspicions.  
Over the next year, we had full-time Special Forces assets 
observing and reporting while training with the AOH. Because a SF Group 
had its own Intelligence unit, we were also able to report our observations 
directly into the intelligence stream. You will see the reaction that 
generated. 
It took a while and a lot of reporting, in-fighting, and rethinking, 
but eventually Southern Command changed its position and came to the 
conclusion there was something occurring on the north coast of Honduras. 
If it had not been for Gen. John Galvin, this might have ended differently. 
Of all the Southern Command Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) I worked 
for over three decades, he was the most effective. Eventually the AOH 
also became believers and, with a little help from us, took the lead in 
dealing with the threat. Ultimately, the guerrillas were destroyed. 
This case is about an insurgency that apparently had all the 
essentials for success but never transitioned beyond Phase One, the proto-
insurgency phase. According to Daniel Byman,1 the success or failure of a 
                                                          
1 For an excellent report on how insurgencies move from ragtag bands of fighters 
or terrorists to “full-blown insurgencies,” see Daniel Byman, Understanding 
Proto-Insurgencies (Rand, 2007). 




proto-insurgency depends in large part on the reaction of the state. This 
case examines a wide range of issues that worked against the Honduran 
government’s success at extirpating the insurgency, including institutional 
indifference and preoccupation with external threats on the part of the 
Honduran Army, bureaucratic inertia on the part of the American in-
country entities, and turf sensitivity by U.S. intelligence. In spite of these 
obstacles, the Government of Honduras (GOH) eventually neutralized the 
insurgent threat. The prevailing question is: How was this threat 
recognized? 
Case study users are encouraged to use both the Vietnam-era 
checklist in Part IV and Analyzing Insurgency (Annex A) as tools for 
getting at the guts of this case. Those of us who were on the ground then 




1. What role does institutional friction play in the slow acknowledgement 
of the existence of an insurgency in this case?  
2. What institutional adaptation does the 7th Group implement to 
improve their ability to assess the situation on the ground?  
3. What friction does this create with other institutions, and why?  
4. How could you overcome that friction? 
 




II. Phase One and Two Insurgencies 
 
Phase One insurgencies are usually more about propaganda or 
public affairs than a serious threat to the government. Scattered acts of 
terrorism may be all the insurgency is capable of conducting but, as we 
know from the Middle East, they can still be effective. Sometimes there is 
a series of well-publicized attacks on the infrastructure, which would 
include electrical, transportation, and communications targets. 
Assassinations have also served the same purpose and are particularly 
effective if the target is a well-known official (e.g., Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo, June 1914; President Anwar Sadat in Cairo, 
October 1981). These types of attacks are relatively easy to conduct, are 
cheaply resourced, serve as confidence builders, and most importantly get 
the public’s attention. In El Salvador during this same period, for example, 
the highly vulnerable power grid was targeted almost nightly by a much 
more developed and aggressive FMLN insurgency. The first actions in 
Honduras were small in scope and relatively timid. 
When an insurgency has solidified a portion of the population as a 
base, has well-established logistics, has developed the necessary 
infrastructure, and has built enough internal confidence and uncertainty in 
the targeted regime, it may be time to ratchet up the volume and go to 
Phase Two. This phase can include all the activity of Phase One as well as 
armed group attacks on public security forces, visible international 
entities, or even well-guarded military bases. It should be noted that 
determining this “inflection point” is an art and not a science.2 There have 
                                                          
2 This transitional stage is expounded upon in the report by Daniel Byman, 
Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, op.cit. The report focuses on “measures that 
indicate when proto-insurgencies may grow into full-blown insurgent 
movements.” Byman cites the following indicators to consider: (1) the strength of 
the proffered identity; (2) group composition; (3) relations with other community 




been insurgencies that have overthrown the targeted government in short 
order (two years for Cuba) and others that have not (20 years for China). 
No formulas, no scripts, and no precedents exist that offer a sure-fire 
roadmap to victory for either side. There had been some low-level 
insurgent activity in Honduras. The question was, how serious was it? 
                                                                                                                                                
members; (4) use of and response to violence; (5) existence of sanctuary; (6) 
external support; and (7) state response (p. 51). 




III. Background  
 
The Cold War in the 1950s witnessed Soviet support of leftist 
movements in Central America, but distance and logistics made these 
threats ineffective. When the leftist Jacobo Arbenz regime took power in 
Guatemala (1953–1954) and began threatening U.S. economic and 
political interests, for example, CIA support helped to overthrow Arbenz.3 
Indeed, throughout the region, the United States supported those 
threatened friendly governments with military aid. With Fidel Castro’s 
1959 triumph in Cuba, however, there now existed a base for exporting 
revolution into the Southern hemisphere, and Castro wasted little time in 
spreading his brand of revolution (see Venezuela 1960). In response to this 
new threat, President Kennedy’s policy initiatives included the Alliance 
for Progress and counterinsurgency efforts to support U.S. allies besieged 
by Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements. The primary 
counterinsurgency effort was carried out by the 7th Special Forces Group 
(SFG) (1961-1962); the 8th Special Action Force (SAF) (1963–1973) and 
the 7th SFG (1973–present).  
From 1960 to 1979, U.S.-backed Latin American militaries put 
these insurgencies out of business with painful regularity. From Argentina 
to Guatemala, Castro-inspired guerrillas suffered defeat after defeat, the 
most spectacular being the disastrous end to Che Guevara’s Bolivian 
adventure in 1967. The Bolivian operation was in large part the result of 
the training efforts of an 8th SAF Mobile Training Team (MTT) that 
                                                          
3Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh, “CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 
Documents,” George Washington University National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book No. 4. Accessed Aug 11, 2011. 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/  




deployed from Panama.4 Moscow, having consistently advised 
accommodation and long-term subversion, watched with an “I told you 
so” attitude. This slower “peaceful revolution” approach seemed to have 
worked in Chile with the 1970 election of Marxist Salvador Allende. This 
success was short-lived, however, as the Chilean military overthrew the 
regime in 1973.5 By the mid-1970s, after repeated failures, the Moscow-
line advocates and the pro-Havana players reached a synthesis and began a 
combination of armed revolution and temporary alliances with dissatisfied 
non-communist elements. This synthesis eventually achieved a near 
success in El Salvador and victory in Nicaragua in 1979.6 The Soviets and 
Castro had finally achieved what had eluded revolutionaries for two 
decades.  
Despite this apparent synthesis of Havana- and Moscow-based 
insurgencies, there were fissures in the façade. “Castroites” were known 
for impatience and Moscow adherents for caution, which sometimes led to 
                                                          
4 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in 
Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007); Stephen G. Rabe, The Most 
Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1999); Michel Gobat, “Review of ‘Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance 
for Progress in Latin America’,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 
(2008): 872-873; Stephen M. Streeter, “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal 
Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions of the Alliance for 
Progress,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 57-68; Ernest R. May, “The 
Alliance for Progress in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 4 (1963). 
5 Paul E. Sigmund “The ‘Invisible Blockade’ and the Overthrow of Allende,” 
Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974). 
6 For a brief synopsis of events in El Salvador and Nicaragua, see “El Salvador 
Civil War,” GlobalSecuirty.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm (accessed July 
12, 2011); William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, “Oligarchs and 
Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 (1980): 1084-
1103; William M. LeoGrande, “The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?” 
Foreign Affairs 58, no. 1 (1979): 28-50. 




rash acts or lost opportunities. Their differences sometimes were violent. 
At the end of the El Salvadoran insurgency, one group recognized the 
futility of continuing the struggle and pulled the rest to a negotiated end to 
the war.7 Honduran leftist organizations had a similar experience but 
ended without a seat at the bargaining table. 
The Honduras case here may be considered the last in a series of 
Soviet-backed attempts to destabilize the region.  
                                                          
7 Charles T. Call, “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the 
Rule of Law in El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 4 (2003): 
827-862; Tricia Juhn, Negotiating Peace in El Salvador: Civil-Military Relations 
and the Conspiracy to End the War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); 
“War’s End in El Salvador,” The Economist, 1 February 1992. 
http://www.economist.com/node/13311602. 






Map 1: Central America and the Caribbean 





Map 2: Honduras, Overview 






Map 3: Honduras and the Bolsones 
 




IV. The Checklist 
 
 The indicators in this checklist8 were designed to help clarify the 
general level of insurgent activity but may only point toward cumulative 
effect. Remember that the typical first phase is primarily focused on 
infrastructure development and in sensitizing the population. Each act, 
even the non-violent ones, are part of that theatre that educates and 
informs the population and points out the government’s weaknesses.  
 
Insurgency Checklist 
1. Have communist-trained leaders been found in the country? 
2. Is there evidence of clandestine subversive organizations in 
the country? 
3. Is there evidence or indication of a subversive organization 
that is receiving external assistance?  
4. Are there detectable efforts to create or increase unrest and 
dissension among the people?  
5. Is there propaganda against actual or proposed government 
programs? 
6. Are there active disinformation campaigns? 
7. Is there agitation or resistance against efforts of the 
government to resolve problems causing dissatisfaction? 
8. Are there attempts to provoke restrictive measures from the 
government?  
9.  Are local officials being kidnapped or killed? 
10.  Is there evidence of small guerilla groups or guerilla action 
on a small scale? 
 
                                                          
8 Source: Special Text ST 31-176 Counterinsurgency Planning Guide, EEI p. 53. 
Pub date-1963/1964 





1. Have communist-trained leaders been found in the 
country? 
 Creating “wiring diagrams” of insurgent organizations is 
difficult and time-consuming, but vital to success. Those 
organizational charts with names, biographies, contacts, and 
photographs are a must in putting insurgencies out of business and 
in many ways are similar to the effort needed to dismantle 
organized criminal organizations such as the Mafia. There were 
communists in Honduras, but due to the operation of General 
Alvarez Martinez, chief of the AOH, there was little activity, and 
few prominent players’ names even made the papers. 
2. Is there evidence of clandestine subversive 
organizations in the country?  
 Getting inside these organizations is dangerous business 
that requires deep-cover agents or turned members. Answering this 
indicator’s question, as with the previous one, relies partly on 
electronic intercepts (SIGINT) and other forms of technical 
intelligence (e.g., PHOTINT)9 for information, but the critical 
route is via human sources. Human intelligence (HUMINT) trumps 
all. The satellite photos may tell you where the bad guys are and 
SIGINT what they are saying at the moment, but they do not tell 
you where they will be and what they have planned for tomorrow.  
During the “quiet time,” the leftist organizations, for the most part, 
were exhibiting a low profile. 
3. Is there evidence or indication of a subversive 
organization that is receiving external assistance?  
 This type of support is the easiest to quantify. Consider 
how much effort went in to interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
                                                          
9 PHOTINT: Photographic Intelligence 




during the Vietnam War.10 The unending flow of troops and 
supplies kept the war in southeast Asia going and was almost 
impervious to our interdiction efforts. But outside assistance isn’t 
the only way to keep an insurgency going. Other means of support 
come from the opposing military through capture; from the general 
population, either freely given or coerced; and from manufacture 
within the organization. In the early stages, an insurgency often 
relies heavily on outside support. As it becomes more developed, 
internal support picks up some, but not all, of the slack. For 
example, when it came to the leftists’ 1984 destruction of the Pan-
American Highway Bridge over the Rio Lempa in El Salvador, 
outside demolition specialists from Eastern Europe were called in 
to drop the bridge.  
 The Sandinistas were making no secret of their support of 
whatever action was being taken against the governments of El 
Salvador and Honduras. Periodically there would be a successful 
interception of supplies, such as the 1982 intercept of a weapons-
laden truck on the El Salvador-Guatemala border. U.S. intelligence 
services are particularly attuned to outside logistical movement and 
its quantification. Once the existence of this support is known, 
however, the real job is assessing how much are you interdicting. 
                                                          
10 “The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a network of routes by which men and munitions 
were sent from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam and 
eventually also to Cambodia during the Vietnam War. These routes ran through 
the Truong Son Mountains, on both sides of the border between Vietnam and 
southeastern Laos.” Edwin E. Moise, “Review of ‘The Road to Freedom: A 
History of the Ho Chi Minh Trail’,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (2006): 558; 
Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175-200; Gregory T. Banner, The War 
for the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Army Command and General Staff College, 1993); 
John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War 
(New York: Wiley, 1999). 




As in Vietnam, the difficulty in quantification is how much of what 
are you stopping. We knew how many trucks were destroyed, but 
were never certain as to many trucks were involved to begin with. 
4. Are there detectable efforts to create or increase unrest 
and dissension among the people?  
 All insurgencies draw propaganda points from an existent 
set of issues or grievances that concern all or parts of the 
population. These issues can be exploited for their propaganda 
value. In Vietnam, for instance, the U.S./South Vietnamese 
Strategic Hamlet program attempted to separate the guerrillas from 
the population.11 It also separated the population from their 
villages and from the tombs of their ancestors, however, with 
serious repercussions and loss of popular support for the 
government. As we shall see below, the Honduran left used the 
presence of large numbers of “gringos,“ the road-building 
operations, and the presence of El Salvadoran troops in the 
Honduran Regional Military Training Center (Centro Regional 
Entranimiento Militar, or CREM) as issues.  
5. Is there propaganda against actual or proposed 
government programs? 
 Even the best-intentioned program designed to alleviate 
discontent can be used as grist for the propagandist’s mill. A twist 
here, a little spin there, and the program becomes ineffective, 
dangerous, or sinister. In El Salvador, the three-phase land reform 
program achieved considerable success in undermining the 
                                                          
11 John C. Donnell and Gerald Cannon Hickey, The Vietnamese “Strategic 
Hamlets“: A Preliminary Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962); 
Peter F. Leahy, “Why Did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail?” 
(Thesis/dissertation (M.S.): National government publication, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 1990); Philip E. Catton, “Counter-
Insurgency and Nation Building: The Strategic Hamlet Programme in South 
Vietnam,“ The International History Review 21, no. 4 (1999): 918-940. 




FMLN’s appeal. The FMLN responded by refashioning and 
focusing on the least effective segment, thereby diminishing the 
whole reform program. Through the propagandist’s lens, the much-
needed farm-to-market road building became twisted into 
“disruption of Honduran tranquility,” “unfairly benefitting special 
interests or privileged families,” or “roads are for U.S. invasion of 
Nicaragua.” 
6. Are there active disinformation campaigns?  
 False, partially false, or marginally false disinformation 
campaigns can generate dissatisfaction with the government and, 
as noted above, with government programs. Rumors seem to travel 
faster than radio waves in rural Third World cultures, and once 
repeated they are often held as gospel, particularly when there is no 
dissenting view. The war in the arena of public opinion is as 
important as combat in the jungle, if not more so. 
7. Is there agitation or resistance against efforts of the 
government to resolve problems causing dissatisfaction?  
 Closely related to the previous indicator, this action takes 
disinformation a step up, and we might witness a peaceful 
demonstration against the government’s programs. A peaceful 
demonstration can be changed to a violent one in a wink and lead 
overzealous law enforcement to bloody reprisal. Each such 
incident can provide the agitator with a new propaganda 
opportunity.  
8. Are there attempts to provoke restrictive measures 
from the government?  
 The next step on the escalator for the insurgent is 
government prohibition against all demonstrations. The real goal is 
to create an environment where all means of expression are denied. 
The unavailability of outlets for debate adds to the frustration of 
the population, which in turns improves the movement’s recruiting 




opportunities. One of the objectives in the Venezuelan FLN 
insurgency (1960–1966) was to incite the military to overthrow the 
democratically elected government of Romulo Betancourt. Once 
that had been achieved, the army would then be able to be more 
easily dealt with. The army stayed loyal in this case, and the 
guerrillas eventually were defeated.  
9. Are local officials being kidnapped or killed?  
 As with other acts of violence, attacks such as assassination 
or kidnapping get press coverage for the insurgents. Hostage taking 
requires a bit more sophistication and nerve, as the hostage and 
hostage takers are in the same target area until there is a break in 
the standoff. A relatively simple but effective tool, assassination 
has been used for centuries. Michael Collins’s use of assassination 
in Ireland (1920–1921) eventually helped bring the British Empire 
to the negotiating table, and assassination eventually helped drive 
the British out of Palestine (1947–1948). Assassination is theatre, 
demonstrates government weakness and vulnerability, and, when 
the victim is unpopular, helps the insurgent gain legitimacy. In 
Vietnam, for example, the targets of VC assassination were often 
tax collectors and unpopular village officials. 
10. Is there evidence of small guerilla groups or guerilla 
action on a small scale?  
 When guerrilla groups begin combat operations such as 
raids and ambushes, it is a sign that things are about to escalate. 
This is the critical moment in a Phase One insurgency. The 
operations in this stage are small confidence-building exercises 
that demonstrate that the regime is vulnerable. If successful and the 
government is slow or ineffective, the tempo and lethality will 
increase. If begun prematurely and the government reacts with 
vigor and competence, the guerrillas may be vulnerable to 




government counterattack, as in the case of Che Guevara’s death in 
Bolivia (1967).  
 
The following series of messages and news reports are the heart of 
this story of the evolution from indifference and near-total disregard to 
recognition, engagement, and commitment. They are a sampling of the 
more noteworthy intelligence reports and indicate the scope and direction 
of both the Honduran insurgent and Honduran counterinsurgency 
operations. It was these documents and others that led this writer to 
conclude that although the Honduran left was not particularly effective, it 
still was out there and needed careful watching. The FSLN success in 
Nicaragua and the near-success of the FMLN in El Salvador warned 
against dismissing a Honduran insurgency out of hand.  
Each message references the Insurgency Indicator Checklist above 
and Annex A, Analyzing Insurgency. As you read each message and apply 




1. What are the limitations of this framework in the 21st century?  
2. Does social media (Twitter, YouTube, blogs, etc.) change the way you 
analyze a proto-insurgency?  
3. Where else would you look for signs of a proto-insurgency in 21st-
century social media?  
4. Does social media activism equate to a proto-insurgency?  
5. Should it be added to the list of warning signs? 
6. What lessons does the Arab Spring, especially the Egyptian 
experience, add to this insurgency framework?





V. Messages and Reports (M&R) 
 
A. M&R 1-6: July 1982 to July 1984 
 
Over a period of two years, a slow but steady insurgency was 
fomenting. These six messages track how, if you have the right questions 
and can ascertain the correct answers to these questions, an insurgency can 
be identified. Episodes of bombing, assassination, kidnapping, and 




DATE: 4 JUL 82  
LOCATION: TEGUCIGALPA  
CENTRAL POWER STATION WAS BOMBED BY MEMBERS OF 
THE FROYLAN TURCIOS COMMAND, A HONDURAN-BASE CELL 
OF THE FMLN [El Salvadoran insurgency]. SEEN AS AN ACT OF 
RETALIATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS 
FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #5, #10  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion 
This act achieved several of the insurgents’ goals. It served notice 
on the Honduran government that solidarity existed among all of the leftist 
organizations and that an attack on one element was an attack on all. In 
addition to the inconvenience of power outages, attacking the power 
station gained everyone’s attention in the capital city and demonstrated the 
government’s vulnerability.  
 
 






DATE: 17 SEP 82 
LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA  
CINCHONEROS SEIZED CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND HELD 
80 HOSTAGES FOR EIGHT DAYS. DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF 
HONDURAN, SALVADORAN [Alejandro Montenegro: FMLN] AND 
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN LEFTIST ACTIVITISTS, THE 
EXPULSION OF U.S. ADVISORS AND WITHDRAWL OF 
HONDURAS FROM THE NEWLY-FORMED CENTRAL AMERICAN 
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #9 and #10 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst; 
and Sec. 6, Force and Coercion 
There is probably no more effective event than a hostage situation. 
Whether the release of political prisoners was achieved or not, the fact that 
the government was forced into negotiations with the Chinchoneros is 
significant. After a week the hostages were released and the guerrillas 
were flown to Panama, en route to Cuba. Not only did such an action 
demonstrate the government’s weakness in performing its key role of 
protecting itself, but it had tremendous domestic and international 
propaganda value. In August 1978, a similarly spectacular operation led 
by Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora marked the beginning of the end 




DATE: 19 JUL 83  
LOCATION: OLANCHO DEPARTMENT  




91 HONDURAN INSURGENTS WITH LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 
FROM NICARAGUA HAD THE OBJECTIVE OF RALLYING UP TO 
3,000 COMBATANTS. BY SEP 83, ALMOST ALL HAD EITHER 
BEEN KILLED, CAPTURED OR SURRENDERED. 
Commentary  
 Insurgency Indicator #3  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support 
Once again, intervention in a Central American country was 
conducted from a neighboring safe haven/launchpad. It was also an 
indication of the insurgency’s anticipated recruitment. That the threat was 
eliminated so quickly and thoroughly had a telling effect on the Honduran 
government and generated a false sense of security. It left untouched the 
potential of Nicaragua as a logistical base for future endeavors. It also 




DATE: NOV 83 
LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA  
HONDURAN INTELLIGENCE UNCOVERED A PLOT BY THE 
PRTC-H TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL ALVAREZ MARTINEZ, 
COMMANDER OF THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES. PRTC-H 
MEMBERS WERE RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAN PEDRO SULA 
WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON HOW TO NEUTRALIZE VIP 
BODYGUARDS AND THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #3 and #9  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion  
This plot, unlike July’s Olancho debacle launched from outside 
Honduras (Message #3), was home-grown and more sophisticated. The 
Honduran Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Partido 




Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos de Honduras, or 
PRTC-H) training took place in the San Pedro Sula, an area with a history 
of radical politics. An assassination of such a key officer as Gen. Martinez 
would have had considerable propaganda value and demonstrated the 
strength of the insurgents as well as the potential for generating an AOH 
overreaction. One aspect of an urban operation is the high-visibility aspect 
with lots of witnesses and lots of media. Keep in mind that an act such as 
an assassination is theater and the target is not the audience. A crackdown, 




DATE: 26 MAR 84  
LOCATION: SAN PEDRO SULA  
FIVE SEPARATE BUT COORDINATED TARGETS STRUCK BY 
THE CINCHONEROS INCLUDED THE HONDURAN SUPREME 
COURT BUILDING AND A MILITARY SCHOOL IN 
TEGUCIGALPA, TWO POLICE STATIONS AND THE 
SALVADORAN CONSULATE IN SAN PEDRO SULA 
Commentary  
Insurgency Indicator #10  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion  
This spectacular operation demonstrated the growing 
sophistication of the insurgency. Multifaceted and well-timed, it not only 
achieved the wounding of the government but also got the region’s 
attention. Once again, the urban setting is instructive re: the population 
and the media. The capital (Tegucigalpa) and the San Pedro Sula were 
“target-rich” environments and pointed out the government’s weaknesses 
in protecting its own. 
 
 





DATE: JUL 84  
LOCATION: EL PARAISO  
INFILTRATION INTO EL PARAISO DEPARTMENT OF AT LEAST 
19 GUERRILLAS TRAINED IN CUBA; MOST DESERTED OR WERE 
CAPTURED 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #3 and #10 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support; and Sec. 6, Force and 
Coercion  
Except for number of guerrillas, this was a repeat of July 1983. 
This insurgent setback marked the beginning of a quiet time. For the next 
17 months, there was little guerrilla activity to report and an internal threat 
almost disappeared. For the Honduran authorities, this was further 





Consistent with our centuries-old policy regarding the Americas 
and as part of the Reagan doctrine of aggressively opposing Communism, 
the United States was working not only to expel the Soviets and their 
Cuban surrogates from Central America but also to upend their clients, the 
Sandinistas. In light of this, it is not surprising the Honduran authorities 
were focused on the externals and had been since 1979, when the 
Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua. When this writer took command 
of the 7th SFG in 1985, the unit’s primary role was to support the 
Hondurans against the Sandinistas’ external invasion threat.  
SF deployments were designed to back-stop and encourage the 
Hondurans in repelling that invasion. Annual exercises saw the group 
headquarters and several SF detachments attached to the Honduran army 




units for a period of two to three weeks, during which war plans were 
exercised.  
When queried about their views as to the threats, a large majority 
(roughly 7 in 10) of the AOH officers told this writer that the Sandinistas 
with their Soviet-made T-55 tanks were the main danger, while the 
minority (3 in 10) still viewed El Salvador and her 40,000 combat veterans 
as such. When asked if there was an internal threat, these officers 
invariably dismissed that idea as having been destroyed in the Olancho 
department in 1983 and 1984.  
There was one notable exception to this conventional wisdom. 
The comments of the Public Security Force (FUSEP) commander 
in the La Ceiba region were of a different cast than the military’s. He 
believed that he was faced with a budding insurgency on the north coast 
and had too little with which to respond. He stated he had talked to his 
AOH counterparts and was told if there was a problem it was a “police 
matter, not an army job” and he should deal with it. He said with only four 
officers and two vehicles he was unable to do much. It could be argued 
that FUSEP, heretofore barred from U.S. security assistance, was simply 
trying to get a place at the feeding trough. (In 1985, there existed a 
Vietnam-era prohibition against supporting police forces. An exemption 
would eventually be granted to both Honduras and El Salvador.)  
However, the police, being closer to the population and its issues, 
usually have a better handle on what was happening in the countryside.  
My discussions with U.S. in-country assets mirrored the AOH 
position regarding insurgency. They were unanimous that there was no 
insurgency and little to be concerned about. This writer had been reading 
the Honduras traffic while an analyst at Carlisle’s Strategic Studies 
Institute and thought there might be more going on there than was 
commonly believed. As a result of these conversations and the traffic, I 
modified the focus of our deployments. Each deploying detachment would 
continue to co-locate and exercise with those AOH battalions as per the 




war plans. Individual team training objectives were also to continue as 
before, but another requirement was included: Each team member was 
provided with the Vietnam-era Insurgency Indicator Checklist. They were 
instructed to remain objective, to observe, and to report any activity that 
might have an effect on their mission to support the AOH in case of a 
Sandinista attack. This included looking inward.  
The following are a sample of the message traffic between March 
and October of 1986, as well as various news reports. By no means does 
this cover all the reporting. Because the 7th SF Group had a Military 
Intelligence Company as part of its TO&E, it could and did report directly 
into the intelligence stream. As we shall see below (23 April 1986), 
bureaucratic reaction was not long in coming.  
The question is, if you had been in place in Honduras at the time, 
what would you have made of these messages? Do you see the same 
insurgency indicators as we did? If not, why not? Moreover, if you had 
been in SOUTHCOM or SOCOM at this time, what would you have 
thought of these messages? Are they persuasive evidence of an 
insurgency? What would it have taken to change your mind? Why did it 
take us so long to change perceptions on the nature of the threat? 
 
C. M&R 7 March–30 November 1986 
 
After 18 months of inactivity, and complacency on the part of the 
Honduran army, the Honduran government, and the United States, the 
insurgency again erupted. In eight short months, from May to October 
1986, the official reaction shifted from an assessment that there was “not 
an insurgency, nor is one likely to develop” (Message #14, 27 May), to the 
realization that the insurgent situation in Northern Honduras was a “great 
threat to the internal stability of Honduras” (Message #21, 28 October). 
Again, these insurgents’ activities follow the checklist referred to earlier.  
 






DATE: 7 MAR 86 
SOURCE: 7th SFG 
LOCATION: LA CUMBRE. 
FUSEP SGT KILLED BY LEFTISTS AT AN INSURGENT SAFE 
SITE/TRAINING AREA. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #9 and #10  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion  
The first indication of instability often is an attack on the police, 
the first line of governmental defense. This incident arose when a FUSEP 
officer went to investigate reports of strange activity in the hills above La 
Cumbre. When he arrived, he was shot and killed. The site was being used 




DATE: 14 MAR 86  
SOURCE 7th SFG 
LOCATION: TEGUCIGALPA  
ANTI-U.S. DEMOSTRATIONS ORCHESTRATED BY PCH. AND 
SUPPLEMENTED BY SOPHISTICATED PROPAGANDA IN LA 
PRENSA, TARGETING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE.  
 Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #4, 5, and 6 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues 
In this incident we can see the age-old hot button issue of foreign 
presence. Probably no other concern could generate such a wide 
agreement among Hondurans as this. Coincidently, little comment was 




made over the low footprint of the nearly invisible Special Forces 
detachments deployed down at the battalion level. 
 
 
News Report 1 
DOI 18 March 1986 
The Armed Forces will present to national and foreign reporters 
today a bus seized in Colomoncague, Itibuca Departmentt, where 
ammunition and weapons, supposedly for Salvadoran guerillas, were 
carried. Preliminary reports indicate that the vehicle was seized over the 
weekend. After a thorough search, lethal weapons were discovered hidden 
inside. 
The national authorities, in addition to this action, have carried out 
several seizures of weapons destined for the FMLN, a guerrilla 
organization that has been our territory to subvert order in El Salvador. 
The number of people detained has not yet been disclosed. 
Colomoncague, in the country’s west, is located 2 km from the Salvadoran 
border. There are about 15,000 Salvadoran refugees in this sector. 
Commentary  
Insurgency Indicator #3  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; and Sec. 5, 
Support  
It was quite common to use commercial carriers in support of 
insurgent logistics. In El Salvador, for example, a truck bound for the 
FMLN was intercepted on the Guatemalan border with several hundred 




DATE: MAR 86  
SOURCE 7th SFG 





JESUITS CONTINUE ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. 
REPORTS INDICATE CONGREGATIONS ARE BEING TOLD THAT 
TF 135 IS BUILDING A ROAD TO INVADE NICARAGUA 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #4, #5, and #6 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues 
The underlying purpose of the Yoro Road was to improve the 
quality of life in the Yoro valley so that the people of the region would be 
less likely to fall for Marxist-Leninist propaganda. Opposition came from 
the political left in Honduras and worldwide. One of the more outrageous 
claims was from some Jesuit priests who told congregations along the path 
of the road—specifically in Jocon—that its purpose was an invasion of 
Nicaragua. A brief look at a map would show just how ludicrous the 
charge was. It is over 100 miles from Jocon in northern Honduras to the 




News Report 2 
DATE: 31 March 1986 
This weekend special Honduran Army troops are looking for a 
group of armed men who have reportedly been sighted by peasants near 
the community of Esparta. The search is being conducted by troops of the 
4th Infantry Battallion headquartered in the port city of La Ceiba, in 
northern Hondruras, with help from light planes of the Honduan Air 
Force. … An officer of the 4th Infantry Battallion, who asked to remain 
anonymous, said that soldiers from his battalion are combing all the 
                                                          
12 Information in commentary provided by LTC John T. Fishel, SOUTHCOM J-
5. 




mountain area and do not rule out the possibility that “guerrilla cells” have 
gone into the jungle. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #10 
 
 
News Report 3 
DATE: 2 April 1986 
A Tegucigalpa radio station reported Salvadoran guerillas crossed 
into Honduras through Mapulaca, Lempira. The guerillas took over the 
town of Los Planes but were expelled by the Honduran Army Special 
Forces. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #10 




DTG: 23 APR 86 
FM:USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO  
TO: CDR 7TH SFGA  
 REQUEST THAT YOU FIRST SEND YOUR IIR’S TO THE 
USDAO/JCIOE, HONDURAS SO THEY CAN EFFECT COUNTRY 
TEAM COORDINATION PRIOR TO PUBLICATION 
Commentary 
The bureaucratic in-fighting began with this relatively innocuous 
request. What was really at stake was whose story was going to be told.  
 Even without analysis, 7th SFG reports on insurgent activities 
were viewed as a threat. Both of the embassy’s intelligence entities (DIA 
and CIA) had consistently reported “all’s quiet on the Southern Front.” 
Once that position was taken, anything that contradicted it was dismissed 




or viewed as a threat. As each detachment returned from its deployment to 
Honduras, it was debriefed by the 7th SFG’s S-2 and MI company 
personnel. Additionally, each detachment had at least one and usually two 
or three operations and intelligence-trained personnel who could assist in 
assessing the information gathered while in-country. What was being 
injected into the intelligence flow was raw information, not distilled 
intelligence. And while no one was making any sweeping judgments as 
yet, it was obvious that something was afoot.  
The issue was in part one of turf or rice bowls and, as General 
Galvin so aptly put it, stovepipes were a major problem faced by our 
embassies. SouthCom was dependent on several intelligence sources, but 
the major contributors—CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and TF-B—
were in Honduras, and they all had the same story. Inertia prevented them 
from thinking beyond their assessments. Gen Galvin recognized that his 
best source of intelligence was the all-source CAJITF in Washington, and 




DTG: 29 APR 86 
FM: CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC  
TO: USCINSCO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM  
SUBJ: INSURGENT ANALYSIS  
IN SHORT THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE DOUBT WE ARE 
CONFRONTING SOPHISTICATED ORCHESTRATION OF A 
MARXIST-LENINIST INSURGENCY IN HONDURAS WHICH WILL 
BE FUELED BY THE GROWING ALLIANCE WITH 
NARCOTRAFICANTES, CUBA, LIBYA AND PERIPHERALLY THE 
SOVIET UNION, WHICH VIEW VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN 
THE REGION AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 
 





This most welcome message came at a time when the theater 
intelligence entities were up in arms over the 7th’s reporting. Remember, 
the 7th was not doing the analysis but simply reporting directly into the 
intelligence stream. SOCOM J-2, however, did analyze the traffic and 
took the position reflected above. This did nothing to reduce the angst and 
noise levels within the theater intelligence community. It would take 




DOI: 05 MAY 86  
SOURCE 7th SFG  
REPORTED STUDENTS FROM THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
WERE USING AN ECOLOGY ORGANIZATION, AS A FRONT TO 
SUPPORT A 12-MAN HONDURAN TERRORIST GROUP, TRAINED 
IN CUBA BY LIBYANS WHOSE MISSION WAS TO CAUSE 
DAMAGE TO PALMEROLA AFB IN HONDURAS 
Commentary  
Insurgency Indicators #1, #2, and# 6  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst; 
and Sec. 5, Support  
It has long been understood that there is a connection between 
some ecology groups and insurgency and that an ecology organization 
might be used as a front. The Honduran Palmerola Air Base had become 
the focus of leftist propaganda efforts because of the base’s central and 
visible role in support of all U.S. military and civic action activities. 
 Cooperation between some regimes (e.g., Cuba, Libya) and 
various terrorist groups had become sophisticated to the point that there 
was a terrorist or nationalist group with access to just about every type of 
expertise or training facility. 







DOI: 21 MAY 86  
SOURCE: 7th SFG  
A COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL (ESCUELA RADIO FONICA) 
OPERATED BY CATHOLIC PRIEST ON THE NORTH COAST OF 
HONDURAS IS REVEALED TO BE A FRONT FOR SUBVERSIVE 
ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTED BY FUNDS SENT THROUGH 
SWITZERLAND 
Commentary  
Insurgency Indicators #4, #5, #6, and #7 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 3, Catalyst; Sec. 5, Support; and Sec. 9, 
Other Questions  
Described by its proponents as the interpretation of Christian faith 
through the consciousness of the poor and by its critics as a “Christianized 
Marxism,” liberation theology grew in the Latin American church during 
the 1950s and 1960s and provided a framework for analysis and 
interpretation of class and wealth distribution. Among the initiatives 
associated with this theology among the Catholic clergy were the “base 
communities” advocated as the preferred path for social activism by the 
1968 Medellin Conference of the Roman Catholic bishops. Created in 
rural and urban areas, these Christian base communities organized 
illiterate but faithful farmers into autonomous economic and religious 
associations under the guidance of the local priest or laity. The community 
members found that their association within these groups supported the 
idea that Jesus had come to save them and to care for them here and in the 
afterlife. The active pursuit of social justice appealed to the community 
members and the local priesthood alike. The Marxist portion of liberation 
theology encouraged the alliance with Cuban-backed activists that 
emerged in the later 1970s in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, 




and elsewhere. For the insurgents, this alliance gave them the legitimacy 
they had been denied. For the counterinsurgents, it added a whole new 




 DTG: 27 MAY 86 
FM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM  
TO: ALL 
SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE SITUATION IN HONDURAS 
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN HONDURAS, BUT 
THERE IS CURRENTLY NOT AN INSURGENCY, NOR IS ONE 
LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE NEXT 6 TO 12 MONTHS. THE 
EXISTING SUBVERSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT ADEQUATE 
TO SUPPORT ACTIVITY OTHER THAN LIMITED URBAN 
TERRORISM FOR A SHORT PERIOD 
Commentary  
Here we see SOUTHCOM still not yet convinced of a serious 
threat. This view can be attributed to a number of causes, including the 
near-total focus on the border as reflected in the assessment of the U.S. in-
country intelligence community I had noted a year earlier. There was still 
the same near-total focus of the AOH and its dismissal of the north coast 
activity as “a police [FUSEP] matter.” There was the near-total focus of 
the Central American Joint Intelligence Task Force (CAJITF) on the war 
in El Salvador and the CIA’s Contra operations against Nicaragua. The 
lesson here is that all bureaucracies suffer from inertia or momentum and 
are not easily diverted. Group think affects analysis. A fresh set of eyes 
and ears may not always be welcomed. 
                                                          
13 Information in this commentary provided by LtC Robert Watson USA Ret and 
the author. 






Five days after the CINC’s 27 May message, I sent him the 
following letter: 
 
2 June 1986 
Dear General Galvin: 
 
By now you should have received the two promised messages on 
the Phase I Insurgency and the evaluation of the Honduran Battalions. I 
hope these prove useful to you.  
There appears to be a difference of opinion regarding just what a 
Phase I Insurgency looks like and our willingness to admit it exists. In a 
recent message (SOUTHCOME SCJ-I, subject: SUBVERSIVE 
SITUATION IN HONDURAS, 272100ZMAY86), the point was stressed 
that there is no insurgency in Honduras. The message describes what is 
taking place in Honduras and then denies an insurgency exists. It is not my 
intention to debate over this point. Since 1979, I’ve been personally 
involved in the ongoing definitional dispute over what Low Intensity 
Conflict is or is not. The rhetoric produced during that debate and now 
with the insurgency in Honduras appear to me as distinctions without 
differences. 
What gives me more concern regarding the message is we may be 
headed toward the oft-repeated error of waiting until it is a recognizable 
insurgency before taking preemptive steps to deal with it. If we deny the 
existence of a threat because it is not serious or denigrate the guerillas’ 
capacity to obuild infrastructures or generate propaganda, we will I 
believe make a serious mistake. The Hondurans are focusing where we 
focus, to date that has been largely on the conventional threat from 
Nicaragua. They will, as were the Salvadorans, be slow to relook the 
internal causes of popular discontent. In El Salvador before October 1979, 




there was a preoccupation with outside support of the guerillas. This 
worked to the detriment of an internal analysis – nation-building answer to 
the root causes of the insurgency. Later, during my tour, I asked the 
Salvadoran officers why this was so. Their response was their leadership 
knew only how to fight one way—conventionally. It was a most difficult 
task to redirect that Army inward even after their insurgency had almost 
(or had?) reached Phase III. What I’m concerned with is the inertia we 
may encourage if we fail to press the Hondurans to look inward and 
prepare for the struggle that will inevitably escalate. While it is my fondest 
hope Danny Ortega will have an attack of terminal stupidity and cross the 
border for real, I doubt if it will happen. I have no doubts that we could 
handle such an eventuality.  
I’ve given much thought to what our opponents seem to have 
learned of late. I believe the key lessons they’ve learned from Grenada et 
al. are: 
“Don’t permit the noise level to penetrate the U.S. consciousness 
again.” 
“Don’t give the gringos an opportunity to do what they do best—
conventional war.” 
“Keep it low on the spectrum.” 
“If the insurgency in Honduras can be kept alive and growing and 
at the same time be kept below the U.S. attention level, then the chances 
of success will be greater.” 
To counter our enemy’s new-found wisdom, I propose we continue 
to work quietly with our Honduran counterparts to develop their 
counterinsurgency capability. We should develop not only their military 
capacity to conduct counter-guerilla operations but also develop the 
requisite sensitivity and capacity to deal with the non-lethal aspects of an 
insurgency threat, e.g., nation-building (PSYOPS and Civil Affairs). It 
costs less in comparison with a conventional buildup and will make the 




Honduran Army even more respected by the people it is pledged to 
defend. 
The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) stands ready to assist you 




DOI: 10 JUN 86  
SOURCE: 7th SFG 
REPORTED THREATS FROM LEFTIST/AUTHENTIC FACTION OF 
THE HONDURAN PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION TO 
INITIATE STRIKES THROUGHOUT THE EDUCATIONAL 
COMMUNITY AND AMONG LEFTIST LABOR MOVEMENTS IF 
THEIR DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION WERE 
NOT MET. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator # 4, #5, and #7 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 1, Underlying Issues; Sec. 3, Catalyst; 




DOI: 19 JUN 86  
SOURCE: 7th SFG 
REPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY 
GROUP (ETAS- AUXILLARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL OF 
SECURITY) BY THE PCH [Honduran Communist Party], FUTH 
[Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers] AND SITRATERCO [Labor 
Union of the Tela Railroad Company] LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS TO 
MONITOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE EL 
PROGRESSO AREA. 





Insurgency Indicator #2  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; and Sec. 5, Support  
By now, the frequency of reports from El Progresso indicted that 
this area was a focal point of subversive goings-on. The El Progresso area 




News Report 4 
DATE: 22 July 1986 
Six Salvadoran guerrillas were killed in a clash with the Honduran 
Army, it was reported officially today in Tegucigalpa. The military clash 
occurred last Friday in the sector of Los Filos in the western department of 
Lempira on the Salvadoran border. The report by the Honduran Army 
states that the Honduran troops did not sustain any casualties, despite the 
fact that they were ambushed by the guerillas while patrolling the border. 
It also states that the slain rebels were buried in the place where they were 
killed to prevent their being preyed upon by buzzards or jungle animals. 
The Honduran soldiers who fought the Salvadoran guerrillas 
belonged to the Special Forces and the 12th Infantry Batallion. The report 
adds that the fighting occurred in the same region where a soldier was 
killed last week when he stepped on a mine made and placed by the rebels. 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #10 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion 
 
 
News Report 5 
DATE: 28 July 1986 
“Terrorism Alert” 




Today the Pentagon ordered all U.S. diplomatic offices and 
civilian and military installations in Honduras to establish a maximun 
security alert due to the fear of terrorist attacks. [These orders prohibit 
visit to urban areas unless on specific missions.] 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #2 and #4 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion 
 
 
News Report 6 
DATE: 9 August 1986 
“Army and FUESP Conduct Anti-Terrorist Operation” 
Upon orders from General Humberto Regalado Hernandez, the 
Armed Forces General Command has proceeded to carry out an operation 
throughout the nation to control and prevent any act of terrorism which 
affects the citizenry. This operation is being carried out jointly by 
members of the Public Security Forces (FUSEP) and soldiers of various 
Armed Forces Units, who are being deployed to various areas night and 
day and are asking citizens to show their identification papers. … Military 
authorities hereby urge the citizens, particularly those who have to travel 
at night due to their studies or work, to carry their identification papers 
and thus avoid problems concerning their identity. 
Commentary 




DOI: 11 AUG 86  
SOURCE: 7th SFG 
EDITORIALS IN “LA TRIBUNA” COMPLAINING OF HONDURAN 
GOVERNMENTS INABILITY TO IMPOSE ORDER AND 




GUARANTEEING SECURITY OF ITS CITIZENS. SUGGEST ARMED 
FORCES COULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IF GOVERNMENT 
IS INCAPABLE OF IMPOSING “ORDER” 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #4 and #7  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 7, Legitimacy 
A time-tested technique for insurgents has been to portray the 
government as unable to maintain order or to protect the population. A 
weak government invites another government, or a coup. Alternatively, a 
government goaded into overreaction plays into the insurgents’ hands 





DOI: 15 AUG 86 
SOURCE: Southern Command J2  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT HAVE 
CONTACTED VARIOUS HONDURAN RADICAL LEFTIST GROUPS 
AND REQUESTED THAT THEY HELP TO DESTABILIZE THE 
HONDURAN GOVERNMENT AND DISTRUPT DEMOCRATIC 
REVOLUTIONARY FRONT THROUGH THE USE OF VIOLENCE  
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #3  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support  
The linkage between the Sandinistas and radical groups in 




 DOI: 29 AUG 86  




SOURCE: 7th SFG 
SOURCE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION 
PERTAINING TO VARIOUS SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THEIR COMMAND STRUCTURE: PROGRESSIVE STUDENT 
MOVEMENT (MEP) TWO LEADERS, TWO ADVISORS, TWO 
COURIERS, ONE FINANCIAL SUPPORTER DAGOBERTA 
PADILLA STUDENT FRONT (FREDAP) LEADER, VICE-
PRESIDENT, LEGAL ADVISOR, FOUR ASSISTANTS OMAR 
RIVERA, MARIO MENDOZA, AND SAUL “SOCRATES” CUELLO 
ARDON HAVE BEEN NAMED AS LEADERS OF THE “FIFTH 
COLUMN” IN EL PROGRESSO, YORO. THIS GROUP IS 
REPORTEDLY CONTROLLED BY HONDURAN COMMUNISTS 
(NFI) AND NICARAGUAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. [Note: This 
level of detail was typical of 7th SFG’s reporting.] 
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicators #1, #2, and #3 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; and Sec. 5, Support 
 
  
At this point, things began to change. On September 28, 1986, the 
7th SF Group Commander and one of the 7th’s recently returned B 
Detachment Commanders briefed USCINCSO with latest set of IIRs. The 
briefing highlighted the escalation and cumulative effects of insurgent 
activities. At the end of the briefing, General Galvin let it be known that 
he had sufficient information to believe that a Phase One insurgency 
existed on the north coast. His exact words were, “I now have the smoking 
gun I need. …” 
With the CinC on board, it did not take long for a major climate 
change to be reflected in the message traffic. 
 
 





DTG: 08 OCT 86 
FM: DA WASH DC  
TO: CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC  
SUBJ: SOCOM REPORTING IN USSOUTHCOM AOR  
THE COOPERATIVE SPIRIT OF 7TH SFG PERSONNEL IN 
PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE INFO TO 470TH MIGP* PERSONNEL 
IS TO BE COMMENDED….THE TRIAL PERIOD OF 60 DAYS HAS 
EXPIRED, AND HAS RESULTED IN THE PUBLISHING OF 20 
BIOGRAPHIC IIR’S AND 7 ORDER OF BATTLE IIR’S. 
2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT 
ITEMS: 
 A. SFG SOLDIERS HAVE INFO VALUABLE TO 
SOUTHCOM…. 
[Note: The 470th MI Group was SouthCom’s MI unit based in the 
Canal Zone.] 
Commentary  
The 7th SFG’s contribution to the understanding of the insurgents’ 
organization was the result of paying close attention to the detachments’ 





DOI: 28 OCT 86  
SOURCE: 7th SFG 
LTC ROMERO, 4TH BN [La Ceiba], STATES THE INSURGENT 
SITUATION IN NORTHERN HONDURAS TO BE A “GREAT 
THREAT TO THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF HONDURAS.”  
RECENT CLASHES WITH ARMED AND ORGANIZED 
SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS, DISCOVERY OF WEAPONS AND FOOD 




CACHES, AND INFORMATION ON INSURGENT CELLS AND 
SUPORTERS, HE SAID, WERE ONLY THE BEGINNING OF AN 
UNRAVELING SUBVERSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE STORY.  
ROMERO INDICATED A LINK BETWEEN INSURGENTS AND 
“NARCO-INSURGENTS”. LARGE AMOUNTS OF MARIJUANA 
FIELDS DISCOVERED NEAR TOCOA IN EARLY OCTOBER 
WORTH 7 MILLION U.S. DOLLARS LINKED TO SUBVERSIVES. 
THE ONBOARD COMPUTER OF AN AIRPLANE CARRYING 1,000 
KILOS OF COCAINE DOWNED IN LA CEIBA 8 OCT 86 
CONTAINED COORDINATES FOR A CLANDESTINE AIRFIELD 
NEAR ARENAL, YORO. ARENAL IS A CENTER FOR LEFTIST 
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. 
Commentary  
Insurgency Indicators # 1, #2, #3, and #10  
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 5, Support; Sec. 6, Force and Coercion; 
and Sec. 9, Other Questions  
Beginning in 1985, an expert from Ft Bragg’s 9th Psychological 
Operations Battalion was attached to each deploying A Detachment. He 
was charged with playing the role of “commissar” (political/public 
affairs/psy ops adviser) and was to participate in detachment seminar 
discussions on the insurgency indicators (see above Indicator Checklist) 
and what, if anything, was going on in their area. He also functioned as 
another set of eyes in assessing the AOH unit the team was training. After 
a suitable period, the teams invited their Honduran counterparts to sit in 
and participate. In time, Honduran LtC Romero became a devoted 
participant in these “seminar” discussions. It is obvious from these 
messages that he became a convert. While it is possible that this 
conversion may have been in part the result of wanting a piece of the pie, 
there is little doubt there was something going on, and he and others soon 
began to focus on the potential of an insurgency in his area of operations. 
 





The same day, the U.S. Defense Attaché reported the following: 
 
Message 22 
DTG: 28 OCT 86 
FM: USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO 
TO: DIA WASHDC  
SUBJ: HO MILITARY SHIFT RESOURCES TO 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS  
COMMENTS: LTC ROMERO IS TAKING THE INSURGENT 
SITUATION IN NORTHERN HONDURAS QUITE SERIOUSLY. 
APPARENTLY, THE CINC AND JOINT STAFF ALSO CONSIDER 
THE PROBLEM THERE TO BE EXTENSIVE AND THREATENING. 
Commentary  
Insurgency Indicators #2 and #3 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 4, Organization; Sec. 5, Support  
Not only had the U.S. point of view been altered but at least one 
major Honduran commander, LtC Romero, now saw the insurgency as a 
real threat. How was it possible that the Honduran military changed its 
point of view? There is a case to be made that the Hondurans saw the 
threat as one that could be used to increase U.S. aid. The AOH viewed 
U.S. aid to the Contras and to the ESAF as a zero-sum game and were not 
happy with how little they were getting. As far as the drug issue, one has 
to look no further than Colombia to see the advantages of linking the 
guerrillas with drugs. Insurgents historically have derived their support 
from the locals, the opposition, their own manufacturing, and from a 
sponsor. The evolution of drugs as a source of finance began with 
guerrillas availing themselves of the drug wealth in a symbiotic relation 
with producers. Later, they cut out the drug producers and began 
producing it themselves. By the 1980s, insurgents were no longer as 
dependent on clandestine resupply. The logistics of insurgency had 




changed to the point where insurgent movements that had the drug 
advantage were almost financially independent.  
The joke in El Salvador was the FMLN could afford state-of-the-
art communications equipment that was better than what the U.S. was 
providing the ESAF. It could be ordered by cell phone from the best 
manufacturers, paid by credit card, drawn from a secure foreign account, 




DOI: 04 NOV 86  
SOURCE: 7th SFG 
A FUSEP AGENT WAS KILLED ON 2 NOV 86 BY SUSPECTED 
SUBVERSIVES IN THE NOMBRE DE DIOS MOUNTAINS.  
Commentary 
Insurgency Indicator #10 
Analyzing Insurgency Sec. 6, Force and Coercion 
 
 




D. The End of the Case, the End of an Era 
 
By the beginning of 1987 SouthCom J-2, Col John Stewart, had 
published an extensive study entitled “Honduras: The Phase One 
Insurgency on the North Coast.” This publication made it official 
although, as noted above, General Galvin’s position had already had a 
salutary effect on the intelligence community.  
In Honduras, combined AOH/FUSEP units with U.S. intelligence 
and logistics support took the offensive. These combat operations 
triggered a number of contacts with the guerrillas, particularly in the 
Nombre de Dios Mountains. By the year’s end, armed field elements of 
the insurgency were out of business. Contra and Sandinista units still kept 
things stirred up on the border, however, and the war in El Salvador built 
in intensity. AOH units throughout the country became more effective in 
their dealings with the Honduran population. (See Annex C.) In November 
1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and the El Salvadoran FMLN’s “Final 
Offensive” failed. The Soviets ceased supporting the Sandinista regime 
and, by extension, the FMLN.  
In April 1990, Nicaraguan president and Sandinista Daniel Ortega 
had an attack of terminal stupidity and allowed himself to be un-elected. 
Violeta Chamorra’s surprise victory ended both Sandinista and Contra 
border incursions into Honduras. Peace came to El Salvador a year later 
with the signing of the peace treaty. In September of 1992 the bolsones 
territorial issues were resolved, with Honduras getting two-thirds of the 
disputed territory. By 1993, a Central American Free Trade Agreement 
was in place.  
 
 













Annex A: Analyzing Insurgency 
by Colonel John D. Waghelstein, USA (Ret.) and Dr. Donald 
Chisholm14  
February 2006  
  
Conventional War is to Irregular War as intercollegiate lacrosse is to 
Indian lacrosse. The former is played on a clearly defined field by a 
prescribed and equal number of players, under defined rules for a set 
time period. The Indian brand was played by any, and usually unequal, 
number on each side, with neither rules nor time constraints over an 
undefined area. Those who would play the Indian brand of the game 
should not expect to be governed by NCAA rules. 
— James Trinniman, late Professor, U.S. Army War College 
 
Planning and executing effective conventional combat operations 
begins with practical analysis of the enemy, that is, imposing a structure 
on the problem, devising several plausible courses of action, and 
ascertaining which course of action is likely to achieve the strategic 
objective. Established planning tools such as the Commander’s Estimate 
of the Situation (CES) or the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) 
were developed as problem-solving tools for understanding and defeating 
                                                          
14 Dr. Donald Chisholm is Professor and Head, Contemporary Operations and 
Environments Division, in the Joint Military Operations Department of the U.S. 
Naval War College. He earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science 
from the University of California, Berkeley. His published research addresses 
operational planning; military personnel systems; cognitive and organizational 
limits on rationality; organizational adaptation; organizational failure and 
reliability; and privatization of public activities. Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: 
Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System, 1793-
1941 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001) received the 2001 RADM 
Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature. 




largely symmetrical opponents in conventional combat operations between 
the armed forces of states. They have been wonderfully effective in this 
context.15  
Devising and executing successful counterinsurgency campaigns 
also demands effective problem solving.16 Getting the analysis right is 
critical. Although it might seem appropriate to employ proven 
CES/MDMP planning tools to problems of insurgency, these tools have 
shown themselves less well-adapted to this context than they are to 
conventional combat operations. The CES and MDMP represent 
formalized expressions of problem solving as developed and adapted for 
the military context during a historical period in which most military 
tactical and operational thought was directed toward the successful 
conduct of major conventional combat operations between states (mostly 
Western) with similarly organized and equipped militaries. They represent 
                                                          
15 John Dewey pointed out long ago that the human decision maker is first and 
foremost a problem solver, following, more or less, several steps to make non-
trivial decisions: recognizing and identifying a problem (an occasion for a 
decision), imposing a cause-and-effect structure on that problem, generating 
alternative solutions, evaluating those alternatives comparatively, and choosing 
an alternative. Dewey’s insights provided the foundation for the work of Herbert 
A. Simon and others in the field of modern cognitive science. See John Dewey, 
The Public and Its Problems (Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1985) (originally 
published 1927). 
16 Although we focus here on the analysis of insurgency as an essential precursor 
to devising an effective counterinsurgency campaign (whether in support of a 
host nation or as an occupying power), there are also implications for those 
occasions on which the U.S. may find itself as a matter of policy providing 
support to insurgency, as it did not so long ago in places such as Nicaragua and 
Afghanistan. Tools for analyzing insurgency do exist. The CIA developed its 
“Guide to Analysis of Insurgency.” There are also Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and 
Terrorism (London: Brassey’s, 2005), which has been used at National Defense 
University, and David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Praeger, 1964) used at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff 
School. 




one useful method of problem solving but do not exhaust the range of 
possible practical methods.17 
Insurgencies represent what Simon has called “ill-structured” 
problems, and others have referred to as “ill-defined” or “wicked” 
problems.18 It is not that insurgencies are without structure; rather, the 
decision maker does not know very much about that structure, in part 
because it may be entirely novel, in part because such problems typically 
involve a large number of variables that interact in important, non-simple 
ways; that is, they are problems of “organized complexity.”19 The decision 
maker’s primary challenge is to ascertain what those variables are and 
how they interact, allowing him to move the problem of insurgency from 
one that is ill-structured to one that is well-structured, and become more 
susceptible of manipulation and amelioration if not solution. That is, the 
bulk of the energy expended will typically be devoted to structuring the 
problem followed by generating alternative courses of action.20 Absent 
reasonable accuracy in assessing the problem’s structure, no courses of 
action developed will solve that problem.  
                                                          
17 We hasten to point out that the analytic instrument outlined in this paper is not 
inconsistent with the CES/MDMP, and with analysis to come we should be able 
to outline how they complement each other and may be meshed together. We do 
not here consider Operational Net Assessment. 
18 See Herbert A. Simon, “The Structure of Ill Structured Problems,“ Artificial 
Intelligence 4(1973): 181-201. In like manner, “wicked“ problems are to be 
distinguished from “tame“ problems. 
19 See Warren Weaver, “Science and Complexity,“ American Scientist 36(1948): 
536-544. Weaver argued that the problems facing the physical sciences 
comprised three general types: simple problems with few variables and simple 
interactions; problems of disorganized complexity, with many variables, but 
whose interactions are essentially random and susceptible of effective 
summarizing by measures of central tendency and dispersion; and problems of 
organized complexity. The last type of problem is that most likely to present 
itself to the decision maker as ill-structured. 
20 See Donald Chisholm, “Problem Solving and Institutional Design,“ Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory X(1996). 




Several specific reasons fall out from this general foundation as to 
why the CES/MDMP planning tools are relatively less effective in 
converting insurgencies from ill-structured to well-structured status than 
for addressing more conventional conflicts. 
 
I. Assumptions 
 Because the CES/MDMP planning tools were not intended for 
comprehending insurgencies, their embedded assumptions about what 
matters in the analysis do not match the essential elements of the structure 
of insurgencies: key factors are excluded, while others are 
overemphasized. Insurgencies are not primarily military problems 
(although they inevitably involve security issues and may include military 
operations). Concomitantly, the structures of insurgency are considerably 
more complex: their constituent parts are at root social, economic, and 
political. However, the oft-repeated truism that the “center of gravity is the 
people” does not take one very far in devising a counterinsurgency 
campaign to defeat a specific insurgency. The truism that countering 
insurgency is first and foremost a political, not a military, problem and 
that effectively countering insurgency therefore requires application of all 
elements of national power, not just the military, also does not provide 
much practical guidance for campaign planning, especially when military 
factors are more readily analyzed and measured. Using such conventional 
planning tools, therefore, can and has resulted in an undue emphasis on 
military force in counterinsurgency campaigns, undercutting the 




                                                          
21 We are encouraged by recent trends in planning military operations toward 
more comprehensive analysis that incorporates and accounts for key non-military 
variables. 





 Insurgencies differ far more from one another in pertinent ways 
than do conventional combat operations. Such differences are typically 
relatively subtle and nuanced. Notwithstanding their surface similarities, 
this obtained even during the Cold War heyday of communist-backed 
insurgencies.22 Given the high probability that the U.S. will, for the 
foreseeable future, find itself engaging in support to counterinsurgency 
across a wide range of states, many of them non-Western, variation in the 
structures of insurgency seems only likely to increase. Distinguishing two 
basic types of insurgency—doctrinal or revolutionary insurgency, and 
insurgency as part of a war of liberation—proved an important step 
forward four decades ago, but does not provide sufficient analytic leverage 
for dealing with contemporary insurgencies.23  
The rise of what some have called a “global Islamist insurgency” 
that may target individual states but maintains pretensions to an end to 
Western power and the creation of a sort of supra-national “caliphate” 
suggests strongly that the range of types of insurgency is being 
significantly expanded, as do alliances between insurgents and criminal 
gangs.24 That is to say, today we do not have an adequate taxonomy for 
categorizing the varieties of insurgencies we will encounter. We cannot 
simply assign a specific insurgency to a particular category and proceed 
                                                          
22 Although the communists generally tried to present a common face to the 
West, profound differences of opinion characterized the various communist 
theorists and practitioners of insurgency, from Lenin to Mao to Castro and 
Guevara, quite apart from differences across the cultures in which they were 
attempting to foment and support insurgencies. The variation across communist 
insurgencies confronted during the Cold War, however, pales in comparison with 
the insurgent variation we confront today. 
23 See Galula (1964). 
24 See Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army, “Countering Global 
Insurgency, A Strategy for the War on Terrorism,“ Canberra & Washington, 
D.C., September-November 2004. 




from there to select from a pre-existing menu of responses associated with 
that category.  
 
III. Evolution 
 In contrast with the requirements for planning and executing 
conventional combat operations, the origins and etiology of any given 
insurgency matter. Consequently, understanding insurgency, generally, 
and a given insurgency in particular, depends on clear, practical, 
historically grounded social, economic, and political analysis, combined 
with sound understanding of the cultural context in which the insurgency 
takes place. The practical lesson of these convergent factors is that no 
single analytic template will work across all insurgencies, even for 
countering insurgency manifested in a particular time and relatively 
confined place.25  
At the same time, the historical record plainly shows that 
insurgency, both generally and in the specific case, has been remarkably 
adaptive in response to counterinsurgency campaigns and new 
circumstances, and often in very short order. During the present period, 
characterized by fast-paced technological innovation, new tools are daily 
becoming available to insurgents and potential insurgents, who have 
demonstrated remarkable speed in adaptation and adoption.26 Oddly, 
                                                          
25 Linn’s analysis of the post-Spanish American War insurgency in the 
Philippines revealed, for example, that, even restricting focus to Northern Luzon, 
variation across small regions was substantial enough to render ineffective any 
approach that sought to treat the insurgency as a unitary actor with a common 
structure. See Brian M. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-
1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon,“ Military Affairs 
51(1987): 62-66.  
26 See, for example, International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading 
the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report N°50 – 15 February 2006, for an 
analysis of the insurgents’ execution of a sophisticated information operations 
campaign against the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government. 




insurgents read, and they know about emerging theories of warfare, and 
they study their opponents’ ways of doing business as assiduously as we 
study theirs—if not more so. The implication is that even as we attempt to 
discern the structure of any given insurgency, its structure is likely to be 
changing in ways relevant to how we attempt to counter it. Given the 
empirical record of the requirement to counter insurgencies for a decade or 
longer, we may be confident that the structure of the insurgency will 
change profoundly. The challenge will be to comprehend the insurgency 
faster than the pace at which it adapts or otherwise changes, while 




The alpha and omega of analyses of insurgency are not our own 
forces and those of our foe. Rather, understanding insurgency requires that 
we consider the focal population, its government, the insurgents’ rank and 
file, and the insurgents’ leadership, along with institutions both secular 
and religious, other actors external to the focal nation, both state and non-
state, along with, at times, the U.S. population. Central to this part of the 
analysis is to understand the complex relationships among these actors. As 
we note below, key to success in countering insurgency is discerning, 
understanding, and exploiting (reinforcing or disaggregating) the seams 




                                                          
27 International Crisis Group (2006), for example, argues that the present 
insurgency in Iraq has evolved through three distinct stages, as analyzed through 
the public statements of its various components: competition, consolidation, and 
confidence. Additionally, we would be wise to anticipate an initial period of 
ineffective groping in the dark in any counterinsurgency campaign. 




V. Sequential versus Cumulative 
Although U.S. thinking about conventional combat now tends 
toward simultaneity and non-linearity in operations and campaigns 
combined with near-continuous analysis and adjustment, sequence and 
phasing remain the underlying architecture of our operational concepts 
and planning processes. And while counterinsurgency campaigns are 
susceptible of conceptualization in terms of broad phases, by force of 
circumstance those phases overlap in important ways, leaving their 
boundaries indefinite —largely because of the myriad actions they 
necessarily contain and the importance of the incremental, cumulative 
effects, vice sequential execution and completion, of those actions.28  
 
VI. Doctrine 
Notwithstanding encouraging recent efforts (not yet secular 
trends), doctrine for counterinsurgency has been and remains much less 
robust than for conventional combat operations, in part because the 
problem is less amenable to distillation in formal doctrine, but also 
because insurgency has historically been treated as an aberration 
distracting from the military’s real business of major conventional combat 
operations against similarly disposed armed forces of other states.29 
Doctrine has usually lagged the evolution of insurgency and in any case 
has remained so non-specific as to constitute an inadequate guide to 
                                                          
28 The empirical record plainly shows, for example, that counterinsurgency 
campaigns based on the assumption that development (i.e., schools, health 
facilities, utilities infrastructure, and the like) can only follow in train of the 
establishment of internal security are not destined to be successful. 
29 This phenomenon is not new. It was as significant in the 19th century as it has 
been during the past several decades. See John D. Waghelstein, “Preparing the 
US Army for the Wrong War: Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865-1891,“ 
Small Wars and Insurgencies 10(1999): 1-33. In the present setting the Army’s 
draft field manual for counterinsurgency and the Marine Corps’ revision and 
update of its classic Small Wars Manual are two very positive developments. 




understanding and action. Consequently, effective counterinsurgency 
planning and execution to date has in practice relied upon the intuitive or 
implicit knowledge of the experienced professional, often an iconoclast 
operating at the margins of the mainstream military.30 Indeed, 
counterinsurgency campaigns have more probability of success when 
devised by professionals with broad personal experience of insurgency. 
 
VII. Systems Perspective 
The complexity of insurgency, in combination with its adaptive 
and evolutionary character and the typically long time frame for 
countering it, suggests strongly the practical value of treating it from a 
systems perspective. We do not here consider the relative utility of the 
various systems models as a basis for an informed perspective on 
insurgency. However, our approach is more consistent with a systems 
approach drawn from a biological rather than from a physical metaphor.31  
 
VIII. Comparative Analysis 
To the extent that systematic analysis of insurgency can be 
codified and formalized, it requires explicit comparison across historical 
                                                          
30 Bernard Fall and Edward Lansdale personify those military officers residing at 
the margin of their military establishments who nonetheless prove highly 
effective in counterinsurgency. Fall was a member of the French resistance 
during World War II, also serving in a Moroccan infantry division. See Bernard 
Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,“ Naval 
War College Review (Winter 1998): 46-57. As an Army intelligence officer, 
Lansdale served in the OSS during World War II, in 1947 transferring to the Air 
Force from which he ultimately retired as a brigadier general. See Edward 
Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1972), and Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The 
Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988). 
31 For an excellent practical example of a systems approach to understanding 
insurgency, see Kilcullen (2004), Appendix C, in which he analyzes the present 
insurgency in Iraq.  




insurgencies. This allows highlighting characteristics common to all or 
most of them. Demarcating those factors peculiar to specific insurgencies 
becomes possible only with an appropriate analytical framework. In turn, 
such comparison and analysis must rest upon a solid foundation of the 
appropriate practical questions about insurgencies; absent such a common 
metric, no comparisons can be effected. Such analysis, we believe, will 
never submit to the same degree of formality as the CES/MDMP achieves 
for conventional operations. It will inevitably require an extraordinarily 
high degree of art on the part of the analyst.  
 
IX. Questions 
 We do not suggest that insurgencies are so obscure and opaque 
that they remain fundamentally resistant to effective analysis, or that 
insurgents are inevitably invincible. To the contrary, like all mortals they 
have feet of clay and sometimes they can be downright stupid: Che 
Guevara comes to mind. We cannot, however, count on such inadequacy 
as a matter of course. Rather, defeating them requires asking the right 
questions and answering them with reasonable clarity and accuracy.  
Thus, offered here is a set of questions founded in practical 
experience, a systems perspective, and key concepts of operational art: 
strategic objective; center of gravity; critical strengths, weaknesses, and 
vulnerabilities; operational factors; and decisive points.32 These questions 
focus our attention on the beliefs and attitudes of the key players in 
insurgencies, their capabilities for action, and the relationships among 
these players. Posing and answering these questions, it is believed, will 
                                                          
32 The Principles of MOOTW (Security, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Restraint, 
Perseverance, and Objective; often remembered as SLURPO) aid the military 
planner in distinguishing the implications for devising operations and campaigns 
addressing problems of insurgency from those of conventional combat 
operations. Thus, they offer general guidelines for thinking about problems of 
counterinsurgency. 




allow the officer confronted with understanding a real-world insurgency to 
assess and comprehend its fundamental characteristics in order to develop 
a plan for an effective counterinsurgency campaign, with emphasis on 
exploitation of critical vulnerabilities.  
Although of necessity listed in linear order, we do not thereby 
suggest a priority for the questions nor a sequence in which they should be 
asked and answered. The several categories of question are also 
interrelated, though shown discretely below: answers to one will have 
important implications for the others. Finally, we note that not every 
question provided here will be relevant to every insurgency, but its 
relevance should at least be considered; and that we do not suppose that 
these questions exhaust the relevant questions for insurgencies of the 
contemporary period or for those that will arise in the future.  
 
1. Underlying Issues 
Insurgencies do not find fertile ground in a population in which 
most sectors are generally contented with their lot in life. Underlying 
conditions of real grievance are necessary, usually described by a 
mismatch between sentiment of a significant portion of the population and 
government policies, especially the provision of public goods and 
services. One implication for counterinsurgency is for the government to 
make significant substantive changes in its policies in order to strengthen 
its ties to and legitimacy in the eyes of its population. Some grievances 
may result from factors well beyond the ability of the government to 
redress. 
 What issues have the insurgents articulated as their sources 
of grievance (e.g., land distribution; ethnic, religious, or other 
discrimination and allied human rights concerns; control of natural 
resources by multinational corporations or a central government; 
access to government offices; access to scarce resources such as 
health, education, or other basic services, etc.)?  




 What are the grievances of the population? Would a 
reasonable person consider them to be valid? Validity of grievance 
is not effectively assessed by objective condition.33 
 Are the articulated grievances of the population and those 
of the insurgency the same?  
 What does the government believe to be the grievances of 
the population? Does it consider those grievances to be valid? 
 Are the articulated grievances of the population the same as 
those perceived by the government? 
 Has the government made genuine efforts to address these 
grievances? (For example, the Sultan of Oman improved health 
services, expanded education, and built roads to outdo the 
insurgents in the Dhofar rebellion [1962–1976].) Are these 
grievances practically addressable, or are they beyond the 
immediate capacity of the government (e.g., major social and 
economic dislocations caused by globalization)? 
 
2. Underlying Characteristics 
Grasping the basic characteristics of the population is essential to 
analyzing the nature and structure of conflict in the focal state. These 
characteristics set the historical frame of reference for the conflict under 
consideration and define the parameters for possible courses of action. 
They are also likely to be suggestive of courses of action aimed at 
reinforcing or widening seams among insurgents or between insurgents 
and the population. 
 What are the primary characteristics 
(political/social/economic/religious) of the population? What are 
                                                          
33 What matters is gap between expectations and experience. On this essential 
point, see Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1970); and David O. Sears, The Politics of Violence: The New Urban 
Blacks and the Watts Riot (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). 




the basic cleavages in the population (e.g., Tutsi and Hutu in 
Rwanda)? Do these cleavages reinforce each other or are they 
cross-cutting (e.g., religious alignments cut across ethnic 
differences in Sri Lanka)? 
 What are the primary characteristics 
(political/social/economic/religious) of the insurgent leadership? 
Of the insurgency’s rank and file? 
 What are the differences between the characteristics of the 
population and the insurgency? Do these differences matter? 
 What are the primary characteristics 
(political/social/economic/religious) of the government leadership? 
 What are the differences between the characteristics of the 




Notwithstanding genuine grievances among a population, some 
sort of catalytic agent is usually necessary to mobilize and translate 
unhappiness into insurgency. Defeating the insurgent hinges in good 
measure on understanding the aims of the leadership, and devising a 
means for separating that leadership from its rank and file and from the 
larger population. 
 Has the insurgency articulated a desired end-state (e.g., 
overthrow and replacement of the existing government, 
establishing a new state from a portion of the existing state’s 
territory, limited self-rule, control of natural resources, or other 
lesser changes)? If not, can an implicit desired end-state be 
derived? What is the insurgency’s desired end-state? In short, does 
the insurgency have a well-developed alternative to the 
government that it is able to articulate? 




 What political/social/economic/religious objectives has the 
insurgency articulated? How closely are these objectives connected 
to the grievances of the population? 
 Are there other unarticulated but implicit objectives for the 
insurgency that can be derived? How closely are these objectives 
connected to the grievances of the population?  
 
4. Organization 
Organization matters. Although state-based militaries tend to 
exhibit very similar organizational forms, insurgencies may take very 
different organizational forms (highly centralized or cellular or highly 
decentralized) and the organization of any given insurgency may change 
significantly over the duration of a counterinsurgency campaign (e.g., an 
insurgency is likely to improve and consolidate its organizational 
arrangements the longer it is in existence). Courses of action appropriate 
against centrally controlled insurgencies may have little effect on those 
only loosely organized. Compound or complex insurgencies may become 
more common and, while more difficult to comprehend, may also present 
more seams for practical exploitation. Similarly, as both history (Peru) and 
recent experience (Iraq) demonstrate, insurgencies in a given place and 
time may very well not be unitary entities; they may be more aptly 
described as compound or complex insurgencies. 
 Is there more than one insurgency? If so, do they co-exist in 
the same space, or do they operate in different areas (as in western 
and southern Sudan)? Are they coordinated, or do they compete 
with each other for support of the population? Are there seams that 
can be exploited? 
 How long has the insurgency been underway (e.g., is it in 
an early, organizing phase or is it in a more mature phase with a 
well-developed infrastructure)? See also Section 8, History, below. 




 How is the insurgency organized (e.g., centralized or 
decentralized)? Does it follow an identifiable philosophy (e.g., 
Maoist)? What is the content of that philosophy? What are the 
strengths of the insurgent organization? Are the insurgency’s 
political/leadership elements distinct from its coercive elements 
(e.g., Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army)? Are there seams 
between the political and coercive elements that can be exploited? 
 Does the insurgency control any territory? If so, what are 
its dimensions and boundaries? Does that territory include 
resources vital to the government (e.g., the Panguna copper mine 
on Bougainville in Papua New Guinea)? 
 
5. Support 
State-based militaries do not typically live off the land; they bring 
their own stuff with them. Nor during conventional combat operations do 
they worry much about the legitimacy of their actions among a given 
population. The contrary obtains on both counts during problems of 
insurgency. Counterinsurgency campaigns must grasp the type, strength, 
and distribution of support for insurgency in order to develop effective 
courses of action.  
 To what extent does the insurgency depend upon local 
popular support? What type of support does the population 
provide (e.g., food, shelter, intelligence, cadre)? 
 Is there an identifiable ethnic, religious, racial or other 
component to the insurgency (e.g., ethnic Chinese in 1950s British 
Malaya)? Is the support of such identifiable components critical to 
the insurgency? Are there exploitable seams? 
 Is support freely provided or is it coerced? Is domestic 
popular support vulnerable to interdiction? 
 How do geography and demographics affect the 
distribution of support (e.g., does support vary significantly 




between city and countryside)? Do ethnic differences fall out with 
geography (e.g., Muslims in Thailand’s four southernmost 
provinces vs. overwhelmingly Buddhist population in the rest of 
the country)? Do some regions offer more support and others less? 
Do these differences constitute vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited? 
 Has the insurgency moved from the countryside, 
unpopulated areas, or safe havens to an urban environment? If the 
insurgents are able to hide within the general population, what 
does that suggest about the movement’s popularity, or about the 
government’s control over the population? 
 Does the insurgency enjoy external support? What is the 
nature of that support (finances, arms, cadres, expert advice, 
political, etc.)? What are the sources of that support (related 
insurgencies in other states, other states, religious institutions, e.g., 
the Roman Catholic church and liberation theology in Latin 
America)? Is outside support critical to the maintenance or success 
of the insurgency (PRC support through Yemen to 1970s 
insurgents in Dhofar, Oman)? Is that support susceptible of 
interdiction? 
 In sum, is the insurgency’s support primarily internal or 
external? 
 
6. Force and Coercion 
The coercive tactics employed and the level of coercion exercised 
varies by insurgency. Accurately understanding the coercive strategy 
increases the probability that it can be defeated and (remembering that 
insurgent violence is theater) that the counterinsurgent agent will find a 
way to exploit that strategy to separate the insurgent from the focal 
population. 




 What is the insurgency’s coercive strategy? What are the 
strengths and weaknesses of that strategy? 
 What types of force/coercion does the insurgency employ 
(conventional operations, guerrilla warfare, raids, assassinations, 
terrorism, etc.)? 
 How well-armed (types and numbers) is the insurgency?  
 What is the net effect to date of the force/coercion used by 
the government forces? 
 
7. Legitimacy 
The empirical record shows that insurgencies do not require 
positive support from their focal population, but that suppressing active 
opposition from that population may be sufficient for their purposes. 
Nonetheless, over the long run, the insurgent will need to build legitimacy 
for its program among that population even as it seeks to delegitimize the 
government or occupying authority. Effectively countering the insurgency 
therefore requires close attention to problems of legitimacy, particularly 
with respect to the development of integrated information operations in 
support of counterinsurgent efforts. 
 What efforts has the insurgency made to establish and 
maintain its legitimacy? How has the population responded to 
these efforts? How has the international community responded to 
those efforts? 
 What efforts, if any, has the insurgency made to 
internationalize the conflict? How has the international community 
responded to those efforts? 
 Generally, what is the information climate? Who is doing 
what in this arena? What mechanisms are in play? Who is winning 
the information campaign? 
 
 





Apart from the immediate origins of the specific grievances 
motivating the focal population, and the insurgency’s near-term 
development and evolution, every insurgency has a history that bears on 
the counterinsurgent campaign. 
 How did the insurgency originate (e.g., a nationalist 
movement against a colonial power; in the wake of conventional 
combat operations between states; with the breakup of a state; as a 
result of long-festering grievances of some portion of the 
population of a given state; etc.)? 
 Is there a historical experience/legacy of previous 
insurgencies in the area of operations/country/region? What are the 
implications of that legacy? Is insurgency perceived by the focal 
population to be an accepted mechanism to redress grievances? 
 Has the state ever had an effective, legitimate, central 
government that provides internal security and services to the 
population and controls its borders (e.g., neither Somalia nor 
Afghanistan have ever had such a government)? 
 
9. Other Questions 
Inevitably, given the wide variation in the structure of 
insurgencies, other questions will also be useful to address in any analysis. 
We provide several such questions here that none of the categories above 
appropriately subsume. Effective counterinsurgency will also hinge on 
carefully and creatively developing other questions to be asked and 
answered about any given insurgency. 
 Are there other legitimate political/social/religious 
institutions (political parties, organized religion, labor unions, 
women’s groups, environmental groups, etc.) that provide other 
venues for mobilizing the population or articulation of grievances? 




Are these groups closer to the insurgency or to the government? 
Can they be co-opted? 
 Has the insurgency formed alliances of convenience with 
other illegitimate or illegal groups (warlords, urban gangs, drug 
cartels, etc.)? What are the bases for these alliances (what goods or 
services does each provide for the other, e.g., finances, physical 
protection, base of operations, etc.)? Are there seams vulnerable to 
exploitation? 
 What are the relevant spatial factors (i.e., geography, 
topography, climate)? Is the state or other area of concern an 
island, a peninsula, landlocked? Are its neighboring governments 
friendly to it, or do they support the insurgency overtly or covertly 
(e.g., Yemen and Oman or Iran and Iraq)? Can its borders be 
sealed? Are there areas within the state that the insurgency can 
exploit as havens or bases of operation (e.g., terrain relatively 
inaccessible to the government such as rainforests or mountains or 
densely populated urban terrain)? What is the character of that 
terrain? 
 What other factors/variables/issues should be included in 
this analysis? 
 
We began by observing that operational-level planning and 
execution of military operations comprises one type of problem-solving 
behavior. Effective problem solving commences with developing a 
practical understanding of the structure of the problem confronted. 
Insurgencies, we contended, represent problems of organized complexity, 
which are most likely to be initially encountered as ill-structured 
problems. For such problems, which are not readily assigned to 
predeveloped categories, discovering or imposing a structure on the 
problem not only is the first step but is likely to constitute the 
preponderance of effort in problem solving. It forms the foundation for the 




development of practical courses of action to solve or mitigate the 
problem at hand.  
Based on practical experience and analysis of historical 
insurgencies, we developed and provided a set of questions that we believe 
will assist materially in comprehending the structure of any given 
insurgency. These questions address the characteristics of the key actors in 
any insurgency and the interrelationships among them, and, implicitly, 
provide a basis for developing courses of action intended to exploit the 
seams, either by reinforcing those interrelationships or driving wedges 
between the actors, while simultaneously working toward weakening the 
insurgent actors and strengthening the counterinsurgent agents. We leave 
for another discussion the specific practical issues associated with using 
the CES/MDMP processes to develop and evaluate courses of action based 
upon the analyses developed through these questions. 




Annex B: Memorandum of Phone Conversation with 
General John Galvin (U.S. Army, Ret.) 
 
20 December 2010 
 
General Galvin accompanied the outgoing CinC, General Paul 
Gorman, to what he described as a highly contentious meeting with 
General Walter Lopez, Commander, Honduran Armed Forces, in April 
1985, during which Gen. Lopez expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with 
the status of military aid to the AOH. The current aid package of $100 
million was tied up in congressional debate. Additionally, most assistance 
that did get through went to the El Salvadorans or to the CIA’s Contra 
training operation in Yamales, Honduras. Lopez felt that Honduras itself, 
which was in real danger from the Nicaraguans and their Soviet-supplied 
T-55 tanks, deserved more. Honduran concerns focused on external 
threats, while the El Salvador war was an internal insurgency and the 
CIA’s focus was on destabilizing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.  
In their conversation about the insurgency, General Galvin 
remembered the AOH forces on the north coast region (San Pedro Sula to 
La Ceiba) as weak. [Note: It was not surprising that these units so far 
away from the main effort would be described as weak. This area was the 
one where the insurgency would develop.]  
The bolsones were a major problem in that they had become 
sanctuaries for the guerrillas. [Note: Per OAS-brokered ceasefire 
provisions, these border areas were forbidden to troops from both El 
Salvador and Honduras. This made them ideal for guerrillas to set up 
camps without interference.] SF deployments were a “two-fers” benefit, as 
the Hondurans got U.S. support without having to pay for it via Security 
Assistance and the United States. SF units improved readiness for war 
plans. The same held for Reserves and National Guard road building, 
airfields, and training at Palmerola.  




Regarding the embassy: Gen. Galvin called Ambassador 
Negroponte first-rate. [Note: The ambassador departed the year Gen 
Galvin arrived]. The General was less complimentary re U.S. embassy 
intelligence entities. What was really “first-rate,” he said, was the Central 
American Joint Intelligence Task Force (CAJITF) operating in the 
Pentagon. This all-source fusion operation had the best of the community, 
who were all-stars in their own organizations and were therefore of real 
assistance (“both protected and did not have to leave D.C.”) . They 
produced “good quality stuff.”  
Regarding the threat of insurgency, the CinC felt that Tegucigalpa 
[USEMB] believed the Honduran Armed Forces had any internal threat 
“under control.” The embassy, MilGp, TF-B, attaché, and station believed 
“nothing was happening.”  
“Any time you deal with an Embassy you are dealing with so many 
‘pipelines’ such as USAID, the Agency, the Country Team, etc., and the 
ambassador has a tough job.” The General believed the only way to fix 
this problem was that all traffic “must have [the Ambassador’s] signature 
on it”—in other words, “one god.” [Note: Dean Hinton, U.S. Ambassador 
in El Salvador 1981–1983, enforced this rule with outstanding results.] 
Gen. Galvin further noted that “jealousies in the Intelligence field 
in embassies has weakened our position.” 
 





Annex C: Recollection 
by Captain Joe Carrerra, 7th SFG 
 
During a trip I made to Nicaragua back in May 2003 … I was 
interviewing a former council man in the port city of Corinto along the 
Pacific coast. During my discussion he mentioned that he was at one time 
the equivalent of a “Batallion Commander” during the war in the mid-
1980s. He was giving his version of his war stories in Honduras and their 
cross-border operations. After a few cold beers he reflected for a moment 
on one of the biggest obstacles they encountered. He stated that an 
important part of their mission was “consentizacion del pueblo” and the 
hardest parts of his mission was to go in after “los hijos de’ puta 
americanos” had provided the townspeople or villagers with medical 
treatment while taking care of the sick babies and elders. I knew exactly 
what he was referring to and I took this as a back-handed compliment. 
They had little else to offer other than their ideology and at the end of the 
day the Hondurans were not too very impressed. As he added, I guess the 
“Catrachos” didn’t get their fill with words, as they still went to bed 
hungry. Perhaps on one level the effectiveness of what we were doing in 
Honduras could be measured on the social side by the Civic Action 
Programs and the apparent success these projects had, in addition to the 
other critical missions we were carrying out. This, coupled with the 
obvious success of the military training of the Honduran Armed Forces, 
served to keep—in concert with several other factors—an insurgency from 
really taking hold in Honduras. As my council man friend summed it up, 
“Los gringos no ganaron en Honduras sin tener que pegarnos un tiro”—
it had the same effect as if they had shot us, without actually having to fire 
a bullet. 
What he meant was the following: The impact of Civic Action 
Programs were quite significant in that they actually did quite a lot to help 




win the hearts and minds of many of the Honduran campesinos that were 
basically sitting on the proverbial ideological fence between a Marxist 
ideology or something else that provided another option, even if it was 
wrapped around the mantle of liberation theology. In the case of this 
particular unit, liberation theology was not their strength. The truth being 
told, absent having a priest or member of the clergy present it would have 
been difficult for to make a strong case for liberation theology . This is 
quite different from the Jesuits that were operating in the UCA [Central 
American University] in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. In other words, 
the Civic Action Programs were extremely effective and had a lasting 
effect long after the Civic Action activity actually occurred. 
 
 




Annex D: Reflections on Contributing Factors  
by Major General John Stewart, J-2 SOUTHCOM 
 
7 January 2011 
 
I arrived in SOUTHCOM in July of ’86. The previous J-2 had 
departed before my arrival. At that time, the big issues were the 
insurgency in El Salvador and secondarily the Sandinistas and support for 
the Contras, though the later was limited by official U.S. policy. Why was 
the elevation of the threat in Honduras so long in coming? I suspect there 
were several factors that supported the move by SOUTHCOM: the 
Gorman/Galvin meeting with the Honduran command in April 1985, the 
increasing need by the U.S. of Honduran cooperation, and the 
improvement of SOUTHCOM’s intelligence operations under General 
Galvin. JTF Bravo had grown to include logistics, training, and 
considerable intelligence collection capabilities. We did not want 
Hondurans fighting their own insurgency nor their thinking the U.S. did 
not take them seriously. Moreover, General Galvin promulgated a broad 
policy in the Americas to improve relations with Latin American military 
institutions. While the main hot spots were in Central America, he wanted 
to improve relationships throughout the AOR. So when senior Latin 
American military leaders presented him with issues, he responded with 
dispatch. In the case of Honduras, he would have put a microscope on the 
budding insurgency. … Was it the focus on [Panama leader Daniel] 
Ortega that delayed SOUTHCOM’s response to the issue of the Honduras 
insurgency on the north coast? I suspect it was. First, I am not sure that 
General Gorman and his staff believed the insurgency to be anything more 
that low level criminal or tribal activity. As you point out, the in-country 
American intelligence folks were not reporting a serious insurgency. 
Furthermore, during the period ’83–’85, the U.S. Congress was debating 
our policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, and one of the results was 




the Bollin Amendment, which proscribed U.S. support for the Contras. 
Additionally, Congress also limited U.S. military presence in El Salvador 
[the 55-man limit]. Thus, in light of the very serious nature of the threat in 
Central America and to U.S. national security interests there as well as the 
restriction placed on U.S. policy makers and promulgators, including 
CINCSOUTH, SOUTHCOM had its hands full.  
When I arrived at SOUTHCOM, General Galvin was very 
dissatisfied with his intelligence organization and their entire operation. 
To that end, I reviewed our entire J-2 operation and our relationships with 
other intelligence organizations, both within SOUTHCOM and nationally. 
We worked with defense and national agencies as well as the in-country 
teams. We set up SOUTHCOM liaisons in our embassy in El Salvador and 
at JTF Bravo. I visited the latter frequently and traveled to DC to establish 
close relationships with appropriate intelligence organization in all of the 
National Intel Agencies. We worked hand in glove with CIA reps in 
Panama and SOUTHCOM and seconded a small military team under the 
station chief in El Salvador.  
As we reviewed the situation in the late summer and fall of 1986 
for every area of importance to the CINC, we identified several major 
gaps and misunderstanding. We then focused on filling in the intelligence 
as completely as we could. Our work to reach out to the broader 
intelligence community paid off. We treated others as team members, and 
since we were closer to what was happening “on-the-ground,” they 
respected our work and helped us to improve collection and reporting. I 
believe that two key elements helped us come to describe that threat more 
accurately: General Galvin’s direction to support Honduras as a key ally, 
and his priority on improving every aspect on SOUTHCOM’s intelligence 
operations and reporting.  
 




Annex E: Early Special Operations Force—What Came 
Before 
by Colonel Tom Kuster 
 
The key intervention was begun under Gen Paul Gorman, who 
initiated the “persistent presence” concept with a series of rolling exercises 
in Honduras—the overarching AHAUS TARA series and other smaller 
exercises of shorter duration. Though billed as efforts to enhance the 
interoperability between U.S. and Honduran forces, they were unequivocal 
efforts to demonstrate U.S. resolve to the Sandinistas and provide 
tripwires for U.S. engagement if any Sandinista conventional retaliation 
occurred against FDN safe havens in Honduras. [Note: These deployments 
were designed not to focus on the potential insurgency but were in support 
of the major War Plan. The advantages accrued from these deployments 
were the repeated contact SF detachments made with Honduran units and 
with the country as a whole.34] 
The FOB 73 section in the attached is noteworthy. On the one 
hand, the FOB was a participant in an overt combined exercise framework 
to achieve interoperability and heightened proficiency with a key 
Honduran battalion on a strategic LOC; on the other hand, it had distinct 
missions emanating from SOUTHCOM, outside the context of the 
exercise, that actually drove its mission profile and task organization. The 
latter, however, were directly tasked by the CINC and unknown to the 
exercise JTF Commander, an example of how Gorman truly understood 
how to employ his Special Forces, strategically and operationally to 
achieve multiple objectives. … [Note: These missions were discontinued 
when Gen Gorman left the command] 
 
 
                                                          
34 From comments by Kevin M. Brew, Student, NWC 




I. 1983-84: Central America 
The inauguration of President Reagan brought about a significant 
shift in U.S. foreign policy—things were going to get significantly more 
proactive as national security attention turned increasingly to those arenas 
where the Soviet Union and its allies were challenging U.S. interests 
indirectly, fostering instability through insurgency and terrorism. The 
Sandinistas had recently toppled the regime of Somoza in Nicaragua, 
installing a virtual Cuban satellite on the mainland. For the 7th SFGA, that 
meant that Latin America and the Caribbean were back on the radar. 
The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, besides having the largest and 
best-equipped military force in Central America (supported from Cuba 
and the Soviet Union), was fostering the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba, of course, had ramped up 
its efforts to gain influence within the hemisphere and its hands were all 
over the situations in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia, to name the 
most obvious. The Mariel boatlift in October 1980 had soured U.S.-Cuban 
relations even further. All of these confronted the Reagan Administration 
as it took the controls of the ship of state.  
In 1983, General Paul F. Gorman assumed command of the U.S. 
Southern Command in Panama. Gorman had recently been the J5 of the 
Joint Staff in Washington. He knew the “big picture” of national security 
and military strategic objectives from the Washington perspective; 
moreover, he knew how to influence the Pentagon and Services to support 
him. His Executive Assistant on the Joint Staff, Colonel Stuart Perkins,35 
assumed command of the 7th SFGA almost simultaneously. That personal 
relationship between the Theater Commander and “his” supporting Special 
Forces Group Commander would prove invaluable, on the one hand, while 
                                                          
35 Perkins had a long history of Special Forces assignments, both enlisted and as 
an officer, including MACVSOG, 8th Special Forces Group in Panama, 10th 
Special Forces Group and Special Operations Task Force Europe (SOTFE) in 
Europe. He was a Spanish and German linguist.  




on the other, it caused all kinds of consternation for others on Smoke 
Bomb Hill and within the Army. The Group now had insights as to what 
exactly the CINC envisioned and what his expectations were for the 
Group to aid him in achieving his objectives. It also gave the CINC greater 
insights into what the obstacles were that were being faced by the Group, 
particularly those beyond the Group Commander’s sphere of control in 
which the CINC’s influence needed to be brought to bear to remedy them, 
i.e., manning, equipment, parts resupply priorities, funding for increased 
language training, etc.  
Gorman recognized that a single SF battalion (3rd Bn, 7th SFGA), 
as allocated to SOUTHCOM in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan’s 
Force Apportionment Annex, was not going to be able to provide 
SOUTHCOM the capacity that would be needed to take a more proactive 
posture throughout the region. The strategic intent would be to engage in a 
full-blown, low-intensity conflict across the theater (not simply a localized 
effort to buttress the government in El Salvador, albeit efforts there would 
also intensify). Foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency were to be 
the priority missions. Persistent presence, particularly in Central America, 
was going to be the routine, not simply a one-time, short-lived surge. 
Gorman intended to challenge any Sandinista or Cuban illusion of a lack 
of resolve on the part of the U.S. 
The 7th Special Forces Group, as a result of the contraction of 
Special Forces units in the mid-1970s, found itself apportioned to three 
distinct Regional CINCs—all, obviously, with widely disparate mission 
requirements: (1) Pacific Command, with responsibility for all of Asia and 
the Pacific; (2) Southern Command, with responsibility for all of Latin 
America (less Mexico); and (3) Atlantic Command, principally for its 
Caribbean responsibilities. The threats ranged from potential conventional 
conflict on the Korean peninsula, contingency follow-on actions in 
Southeast Asia, communist-inspired insurgencies in Central and South 
America, instability in the Caribbean to include any contingencies 




regarding Cuba, even including defense of Alaska in the event of conflict 
with the former Soviet Union. The breadth of the 7th Group’s Mission 
Essential Task Lists and requisite language, area, and cultural orientation 
was staggering. 
The efforts began immediately to reprioritize and reorganize the 
focus of the entire Group. Area orientation and theater alignment were 
shifted to apportion the entire Group to the CINC in SOUTHCOM, with 
LANTCOM relegated to a secondary priority and the Asia/Pacific 
responsibilities shifted to the 12th SFGA (USAR). Planning for 
involvement in the Korea exercise FOAL EAGLE was terminated.36 7th 
SFGA’s long association with Asia/Pacific was now over. Latin America 
and the Caribbean were to be the sole focus, Job #1. 
The area and language reorientation (away from Asia/Pacific focus 
to a Latin American focus) brought an immediate need to stock the Group 
with as many Spanish linguists, hopefully with regional experience, as 
possible and to do it fast. For some inexplicable reason, language 
orientation had not been an overriding factor in how the personnel 
management system determined where individuals were assigned. Guys 
who had been assigned to 3/7 SFGA in Panama (the majority of whom 
were Spanish linguists) were being parceled out to other units on Smoke 
Bomb Hill when they rotated back to the States; some had even been 
assigned to the European-focused 10th Special Forces Group at Fort 
Devens, Massachusetts. Some assignments made sense; guys with special 
skill sets being assigned as key instructors in the SF Schools system or if 
they held a senior grade (e.g., Sergeant Major) that had lower vacancies 
than the more junior enlisted grades. Some were amazingly nonsensical; 
one case was an African-American Weapons Sergeant (E-7, Sergeant First 
                                                          
36 7th SFGA provided a small liaison element, under the control of the Group 
DCO, to facilitate the transition of the 12th SFGA into a primary role in FOAL 
EAGLE and continue with the 12th during the exercise (November 1983). After 
that the 7th SFGA essentially disengaged from involvement with USPACOM. 




Class), fluent in both Spanish and Portuguese, who had been assigned 
from 3/7 SFGA to a SFOD-A in the 10th SFGA with an area orientation to 
Poland—not much chance that he’d survive behind Soviet lines in Poland 
trying to blend into the local population! BG Joe Lutz, then Commander 
of the USA JFK Center, perhaps recognizing that pressure was surely 
coming from Gorman or others, changed the rules, giving the Group carte 
blanche to screen all the other units for Spanish linguists so they could be 
identified for consideration for reassignment to the 7th SFGA. This was 
the first infusion and, as they came in, others with Pacific orientations who 
may even have had long linkages with the 7th SFGA were moved out to 
make room … a painful but necessary step.37 New officers and NCOs who 
were coming out of the SF Qualification Course, and were destined for 
assignment to 7th SFGA, were cycled through Spanish language training 
(at Fort Bragg) before joining the Group. Those who failed to achieve 
basic proficiency (at the lowest level, i.e., 1-1) were diverted to other 
assignments whenever possible. Funding was identified to increase local 
Spanish language training at Fort Bragg facilities, to include the Army 
Education Centers. The command mantra was simple: “If you can’t speak 
Spanish, you won’t deploy. If you’re non-deployable, we need to replace 
you.” There was a swell of resistance, especially from those who feared 
being on the outside, looking in. The undertone was that the “Panama 
Mafia” was taking over the Group … and casting all others aside. The 
actual truth, however, was that mantra was right on target—we couldn’t 
afford to carry anyone who wasn’t going to contribute to the mission. If 
you weren’t a linguist, able to operate with indigenous folks downrange, 
than you better have some unique skill that we really needed to justify 
your retention within the Group while you developed some degree of 
language proficiency. The intent from the SOUTHCOM Commander was 
                                                          
37 Many of the old Asia-Pacific hands who were moved out of the 7th SFGA 
were designated to form the core of the 1st SFGA Headquarters and the 1st SF 
battalion (Okinawa) that were in the very early stages of re-activation. 




clear—he intended to employ the Group extensively within Honduras (and 
wherever else needed) to create persistent presence to counterbalance 
Cuban-Nicaraguan efforts to destabilize the area. 
As this was occurring, significant command and control 
arrangements were also placed into effect. At that time (spring 1983), the 
SOUTHCOM special operations staff (J3 Special Operations Division) 
was a small staff component; Theater Special Operations Commands 
(TSOCs) had not been established and wouldn’t be for several years. It 
was clear that funneling the relationship of the Group to the wider 
SOUTHCOM staff and CINC through that small J3-SOD component was 
not going to be either effective or efficient. The Group’s relationship 
would become more of one like any other major component of the joint 
force, with a direct relationship to the J3 and Theater Operations Center 
for reporting, e.g., operations reporting, quarterly training briefings, 
readiness reporting, etc., and the Commander receiving command 
guidance and intent from the CINC (often directly). Neither the Army 
Component Commander (193d Infantry Brigade Panama) nor the 
Commander of the soon-to-be activated 1st US Army Special Operations 
Command (Provisional)38 were in the operational chain of command for 
the conduct of activities directed by the SOUTHCOM CINC through his 
staff. The Group HQs at Fort Bragg converted from a peacetime construct 
to that of a Special Forces Operational Base as called for doctrinally, with 
an Operations Center and Support Center to manage all activities. The 
second floor of the Group HQ’s building on Ardennes was secured with 
                                                          
38 As a result of a year-long Special Forces Mission Area Analysis that had been 
pushed by Army Chief of Staff GEN Shy Meyers, the Commander JFK Center 
(MG Joe Lutz) had been directed to reorganize and establish the 1st SOCOM 
(Provisional) in 1983. Meyer was well aware of growing pressure in the 
Congress for a major consolidation of all Special Operations Forces within a new 
functional Combatant Command and proactively postured Army Special Forces 
for the change he saw as inevitable. In 1986, Congress mandated the 
establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command.  




access control, RATT rig communications were established 24/7 with 
forward deployed elements, Area Specialist Teams were staffed within the 
Operations Center to support deployed elements within an AST’s assigned 
Area of Responsibility, Red Switch communications were emplaced to 
allow the CINC direct communications connectivity with the Commander 
and the Theater TOC with the SFOB Operations Center. Even small things 
began to change; rather than referring to “companies,” the lexicon shifted 
to terms like B detachments, Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Area 
Command Bases (ACBs), etc. While the administrative and sustainment 
relationship for the Group and the CONUS-based battalions remained 
through the 1st SOCOM (Provisional), the operational chain of command 
shifted to a direct support (DS) relationship between the Theater 
Command and the Group. Initially, the rank-imbalanced power struggle 
over who would ultimately control the operational employment of the 3rd 
SF Battalion in Panama played out between the Group Commander (a 
colonel) and the Commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (a major 
general), but in the end the SOUTHCOM CINC made it clear that all 
Special Forces assets would be managed and employed through the Group 
and its SFOB.39  
The Regional Military Training Center (Centro Regional de 
Entrenamiento Militar, or CREM), on the northern coast of Honduras, 
serves as a case in point to demonstrate how quickly things did indeed 
change. 
By 1982, it was clear that the Salvadoran Army needed a system 
that would enable refit, reconstitution, and retraining of its forces to 
                                                          
39 Ironically, the Army Component Commander in SOUTHCOM (MG Fred 
Woerner) would later become the CINC SOUTHCOM, but by that time, not only 
had the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act been placed into effect 
but his view from the Joint perspective outweighed his previous parochial 
Service view. Additionally, SOUTHCOM by that time had a Theater Special 
Operations Command (SOCSOUTH) to command and control theater special 
operations. 




succeed in what was becoming a protracted counterinsurgency campaign 
against the FMLN. The existing facility in eastern El Salvador, the Centro 
de Entrenamiento Militar de las Fuerzas Armadas (CEMFA), handling 
basic and advanced individual training40 and turning conscripts into 
soldiers, couldn’t handle the expected demand, nor was the operational 
environment conducive to the objectives of focused collective training. 
Moreover, once the U.S. Congress put a ceiling on the number of U.S. 
military advisors in El Salvador at 55,41 conduct of this mission inside El 
Salvador was essentially out of the question. The first choice for a training 
site outside the continental U.S. was at the U.S. Army School of the 
Americas, collocated at Fort Gulick, Panama with the 3rd SF Battalion 7th 
SFGA, but the Panamanian government denied the request to bring the 
Salvadoran units into Panama. Seeking an alternative that would neither 
stir any repercussions within the U.S. Congress nor incite internal 
opposition42 within the host country, the decision to use Puerto Castilla,43 
                                                          
40 There was a continuous presence of Special Forces trainers at the CEMFA to 
guide the effort; formed as a Mobile Training Team, under the supervision of the 
USMILGP in San Salvador, the mission was primarily resourced from the 3d SF 
Bn 7th SFGA from Panama. 
41 There has always been a debate as to the genesis of the magic number “55” as 
the cap on U.S. advisors. The tale that resonates the most is that when questioned 
by the Congress as to how many advisory personnel he thought he would need 
authorized, General Gorman responded, “55.” He had recently been briefed at 
Fort Gulick, Panama by the Commander of the 3rd SF Battalion, who had 
estimated that 55 SF personnel (as OPATTs, MTTs, etc.) would probably be 
needed to enhance the ESAF operational capability (a planning figure). That 
estimate did not include the multitude of non-SF requirements (logistics, 
communications, medical, aviation maintenance, etc.) that would also be needed 
to accomplish objectives outside the SF purview. In reaching for a number, he 
recalled the brief, and responded “55”—a cap that often became difficult to live 
within. 
42 There were conflicts in the Honduran Congress and opposition from various 
factions in Honduran society that the introduction of Salvadoran soldiers on 
Honduran soil was a violation of Honduras’ declared neutrality. On 20 June 




Honduras as the site for CREM was finalized in May 1982 when 
Honduras signed an amendment to a 1954 military collaboration 
agreement with the U.S.  
The mission of establishing the training facility and actually 
conducting the training was a security assistance activity—funded via 
military aid packages, approved by the U.S. Congress, for El Salvador 
(and to a lesser degree, Honduras). Previously, security assistance projects 
(MTTs, TATs, etc.) had been managed on Smoke Bomb Hill by an office 
known as the Security Assistance and Training Management Office 
(SATMO) under the direction of the Commandant, U.S. Army Institute for 
Military Assistance. This endeavor was too big, too complex, and had too 
much at stake to have what was essentially an administrative staff element 
in charge. In the eyes of the CINC, the mission was one for the 7th SFGA. 
Though any and all requirements that may be called for to remain 
consistent with security assistance parameters would be observed, the 
command and control of the mission would be executed through normal 
operational command and control of Theater CINC (through the Theater 
TOC) to the Group Commander (through the SFOB Operations Center) to 
the U.S. Mission Commander (at the CREM). 
The Commander C-71 (1st SF Battalion 7th SFGA) was given the 
CREM mission, organizing a multidisciplinary task force of trainers, 
                                                                                                                                                
1983, the National Congress held a closed-door session to vote on the existence 
of the base. A compromise to quiet the opposition stated that the Salvadorans 
would not be called soldiers but rather “students” and the U.S. military personnel 
would not be called advisors, but rather “instructors.” Ironically, the personnel of 
the 7th SFGA had already arrived in-country the week before with all their 
equipment, and preparations were underway to begin the mission. 
43 Although two locations (Puerto Castilla and Trujillo, the capital of Colon 
department) were commonly referred to as the site of the CREM, it was actually 
about 20 minutes away from Puerto Castilla near the small town of Silin on about 
140 hectares. A legal battle over the actual ownership of the land persisted in the 
Honduran courts for years. 




logisticians, and communications personnel, to deploy to Honduras for the 
first increment of 179-day rotations that was to last through 1985 when the 
CREM closed. This first element had to start from scratch: No existing 
facility to begin with, no viable airfield to sustain and resupply the 
mission, no training infrastructure (ranges, training areas, etc.) … they had 
to start there before they could even begin accepting Salvadoran units for 
training. Task Force C-71 had to deploy to Honduras by sea—arrival by 
air wasn’t an option. The landing strip at Trujillo couldn’t accept the gross 
cargo weight of USAF aircraft, and ground movement by road from the 
major commercial airfields at San Pedro Sula or Tegucigalpa also wasn’t 
possible. The coastal road network was primitive to say the best; they 
were virtually impassable during the rainy season. Sustainment was by sea 
until infrastructure could be developed.44 
The mission was to convert units of the Salvadoran Army into 
special counterinsurgency battalions called “hunter” battalions or 
cazadores of about 350 men. Their mission was to complement the ESAF 
Infantry Brigades assigned a regional presence mission by conducting 
search and clear operations in areas occupied by the FMLN guerrillas, 
which the Salvadoran government would follow-up with reconstruction 
projects of social or economic development within a security framework 
to be provided by the regional brigade.45 As a first step, however, the 
                                                          
44 Eventually the infrastructure around Trujillo and Puerto Castilla was 
significantly improved to sustain the CREM’s operations. Existing docks were 
extended; a new dock was added. Warehouses were built. A petroleum storage 
facility was installed. The landing strip at Trujillo was extended. Roads to San 
Pedro Sula and La Cieba were repaired and asphalted, finally linking Puerto 
Castilla with Tegucigalpa. Other U.S. military units that came later for the 
multiple combined exercises that followed benefited from these improvements, 
as did the general economy of the area. When TF C-71 established its initial base 
camp they were almost completely flooded out by the first rainy season—no one 
anticipated just how bad the coastal flooding would actually be.  
45 Following a concept that would return in later years in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan to “clear, hold, secure, and sustain,” providing an environment in 




initial training was provided to a Honduran Army company that was 
assigned a security mission for the CREM. The ESAF units were not 
newly constituted; largely, they were battle-tested units that were 
undergoing refit and reconstitution. Both individual and collective tasks, 
culminating in battalion-level operations, were covered. Additionally, 
lessons learned and information on noted deficiencies that were being 
experienced by the U.S. Military Operational Planning and Training 
Teams (OPATTs) assigned to the ESAF Infantry Brigades were passed 
along to the training cadre at the CREM for incorporation into the 
program(s) of instruction to systemically spread them throughout the 
ESAF ground forces. 
With efforts now underway to strengthen the operational capability 
of the Salvadoran Army to confront and succeed under the 
counterinsurgency combat conditions in their country, Gorman set his 
sights on key supporting objectives. Several key factors had to be 
addressed to meet the very real threat of Sandinista adventurism: the 
capabilities and resolve of Honduras had to be bolstered, lines of 
clandestine supply emanating from Nicaragua and Cuban had to be 
curtailed, and the threat of Sandinista incursions into Honduran territory to 
attack sanctuaries of the Nicaraguan opposition (commonly referred to as 
the Contras) had to be countered by clear demonstrations of U.S. resolve 
and genuine preparations to deal with such a contingency. 
In February 1983, the United States and Honduras conducted a 
joint-combined military exercise, AHAUS TARA (“BIG PINE”), at that 
time the largest of its kind ever held in Honduras. It included roughly 
1,500 U.S. military personnel46 and over 4,000 members of the Honduran 
                                                                                                                                                
which the population could be secure from guerrilla action while the government 
sought to implement programs to win their confidence and meet social needs. 
46 Billed as an exercise to improve the interoperability of combined forces, it 
included a wide variety of US military elements. US Army elements provided 
mobility for Honduran forces and logistics and communications support. US 




Armed Forces, but the level of participation of Special Forces was 
marginal. To continue U.S. engagement, SOUTHCOM immediately began 
the planning of a follow-on exercise, AHAUS TARA II, to begin in August. 
AHAUS TARA II was to be a considerably more extensive military 
exercise, involving over 5,000 U.S. military personnel with a JTF HQs 
(JTF-11) provided by Readiness Command (REDCOM) in Tampa to 
provide command and control. This exercise, however, was to have a 
much greater participation by Special Forces from the 7th SFGA. The 
Group, however, would find itself operating off two distinct task menus—
one generated by the exercise planners and command element from 
REDCOM and another with much more significant real-world 
implications provided through the CINC and J3 of SOUTHCOM but not 
shared with the REDCOM JTF and its exercise planners and staff. 
In the general exercise plan, 7th SFGA was called upon to plan and 
conduct a series of small-unit counterinsurgency exercises with the 11th 
Infantry Battalion of the Honduran Army, essentially to build upon the 
skills that they had received from an MTT from 3rd SF Bn 7th SFGA 
during the previous AHAUS TARA I. The 11th Infantry Battalion’s 
cantonment area (cuartel) was strategically located in southern Honduras 
astride the Pan American Highway. The wider operational mission for the 
Group that was not addressed in the exercise plan, however, had many 
more moving parts. 
True, there was a mission to conduct small-unit exercises, 
eventually culminating in battalion-level operations and planning, but 
there were other objectives beyond merely enhancing the proficiency of 
the unit in its individual and collective tasks. The exercises were to expand 
the operational presence of the battalion throughout its assigned sector 
away from the “close to the cuartel” modus operandi that had existed up 
                                                                                                                                                
Navy elements included two landing ships and landing craft for amphibious 
movement. USAF coordinated and supported air supply and sustainment 
operations as well as airfield and air traffic control. 




to that time, while achieving a degree of interoperability with U.S. forces. 
These would be the same objectives for most of the other U.S. military 
units that would be participating in the AHUAS TARA II exercise, 
regardless of their Service or function.  
However, beyond the awareness of the other exercise participants 
and the JTF cadre, the Group had additional tasks with more real-world 
connotations—tasks that significantly changed the SF component’s profile 
from a simple exercise unit to something else. To understand these 
missions and their role in the overall strategic intent of the CINC, one has 
to appreciate not only the political-military environment of the situation 
but also the geographic importance of where the 7th SFGA’s activities 
were to occur. 






Figure 1: Gulf of Fonseca 
 
The Gulf of Fonseca was a strategic LOC for Sandinista resupply 
of the FMLN insurgency in El Salvador. It provided direct maritime 
access for small craft, fishing vessels, etc., from Nicaraguan ports, 
particularly Potosi, to the southern coast of El Salvador to include access 
to the Lempa River. The Pan American Highway transited from Nicaragua 
along the Honduran coast into El Salvador, providing another key LOC for 
smuggling of weapons, munitions, and key equipment. In the lexicon of 
any military planner, the area was key terrain for the adversary. From 
another perspective, it was also key terrain to support the introduction of 
FOB 73 Radar Site ESAF Naval 




U.S. force and sustainment into southern Honduras if a Sandinista 
invasion were to occur. The only viable docking area along the southern 
coast was near San Lorenzo, a short distance from the 11th Infantry 
Battalion’s cuartel. To the western side of San Lorenzo was a rudimentary 
landing strip that, if enhanced, could be used as an air LOC. Tiger Island, 
a short distance off the coastline, provided excellent sight lines for radar to 
track maritime and air movement across the Gulf. The reasons why 
Gorman wanted 7th SFGA smack dab in the middle were blatantly 
obvious to the Group planners but largely escaped the understanding of 
many in the JTF, who were firmly entrenched in an “exercise” mentality. 
The mission analysis at the Group level led to the development of a 
set of core missions that would drive all subsequent planning, particularly 
the task organization, i.e., its versatility, its robustness, and its 
preparedness to rapidly shift from an exercise paradigm to combat 
operations: 
 Through persistent presence, deter and disrupt smuggling of 
weapons and supplies from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas 
via the Pan American Highway LOC 
 Expand proficiency and operational reach of the Honduran units(s) 
in order to be prepared to oppose/obstruct a Sandinista incursion 
across their border in the sectors paralleling the Pan American 
Highway; be prepared to counter a Sandinista incursion (to include 
anti-armor) along the Pan American Highway by force 
 Conduct active force protection and situational awareness 
 Maintain a mobile Quick Reaction Force capable of reinforcing 
Tiger Island and other contingencies as directed by SOUTHCOM  
 
The mission clearly called for a Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
capable of conducting independent operations, with minimal reliance on 




support from other U.S. forces that may be in-country. FOB 7347 was 
tasked organized much like the Special Action Force concept originated 
by the 8th SFGA in the 1960s. The FOB C2 element was based on the 
larger SFOD-B model of the 70s with a full staff, S1 through S-5. Six 
SFOD-As were assigned.48 The Group’s Aviation Platoon was attached,49 
along with a PsyOps/Civil Affairs team to handle civil-military operations 
and civic action.50 Additional engineer capacity was considered, primarily 
to assist in the construction of defensive positions (and to support civic 
action projects), but the idea was jettisoned when SOUTHCOM planners 
decided to collocate an Army Engineer Battalion with the FOB to improve 
both the docking piers and the austere landing strip to support 
contingencies requiring rapid reinforcement. The engineers were to be 
assigned an additional mission to support construction needs of the FOB. 
                                                          
47 The “73” designation was based on the fact that the then 3/7 SFGA Executive 
Officer (i.e., C-73) MAJ Phil Kensinger was to be FOB Commander. A fluent 
Spanish speaker was deemed essential to lead the mission, given the anticipated 
need to interact routinely with not only the Honduran 11th Battalion Commander, 
but others throughout the Honduran General Staff. LTG Kensinger would later 
culminate his career as the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command.  
48 One of the SFOD-As was detached from the FOB location at San Lorenzo and 
positioned on Tiger Island to lead the security efforts that protected the radar and 
communications facilities on top of the mountain and the OGA maritime 
activities at the base. 
49 The UH-1Hs operated from the FOB location; the 101st Air Assault Aviation 
Battalion based in Palmerola provided lift support to all other U.S. forces. To 
ensure the operational readiness of the FOB’s helos, the 7th SFGA SFOB 
requested that SOUTHCOM direct a higher priority (FAD-1) for the FOB 73 
Aviation Platoon for parts, supplies, fuels, lubricants, etc. A Forward Area Refuel 
and Re-arming Point (FARRP) were established at the FOB and to their great 
consternation the 101st Aviation Battalion was tasked to support any needs of the 
FOB Aviation Platoon as a mission-essential priority.  
50 Augmentation to the PsyOps/CA team was rolled in and out throughout the 
deployment to support a wide variety of civic action activities, such as dental, 
veterinary, well drilling, etc. 




SOT-As from the Group’s Military Intelligence Company, as well as 
counterintelligence personnel, were also included in the FOB’s force 
package. If that wasn’t enough, the package also required that a Secure 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) be established at the FOB; 
without it, the SOT-As would have been marginalized and the FOB’s 
connectivity to real-time sensitive intelligence from SOUTHCOM would 
not have existed. SOUTHCOM validated the need and requested the full 
support of the DIRNSA to make it happen, which it did. The only SCIF 
operational within the U.S. forces engaged in AHUAS TARA II was at 
FOB 73—something that should have been a signal to the planners in 
REDCOM and JTF-11 that there was more involved in the FOB 73 
mission than it appeared. 
As an aside, a little-known aspect shows the attention to detail and 
the level of preparations involved in the pre-deployment ramp-up for the 
mission. A pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) to the Honduran 11th 
Battalion discovered that the unit’s proclivity to avoid extended patrolling 
was partially based on the fact that they had no means to resupply forward 
elements in the difficult terrain throughout their sector. The survey team 
itself had rented horses from local campesinos to do their off-road area 
reconnaissance, but the Honduran military had never considered that 
option. With these insights gleaned from the PDSS, the Group arranged 
for some members of the deploying SFOD-As to attend a civilian mule-
skinning school in Pocatello, Idaho, where they learned the fundamentals 
of load packing and horsemanship in order to provide advisory assistance 
to the Hondurans on what was going to be for them a new method of 
resupply. 
FOB 73 deployed to Honduras in August 1983 with a full combat 
load, plus all the training aids and equipment they’d need to conduct the 
individual and collective training of the 11th Battalion. Additionally, they 
brought in the materials (sandbags, concertina wire) that they would need 




to convert the sleepy Honduran cuartel into the virtual firebase it quickly 
became. 
With the CREM operating full bore on the north coast and FOB 73 
in the south, the SFOB established a Forward Area Support Team (FAST) 
in Tegucigalpa to facilitate reception, staging, and onward integration 
(RSOI) of unit personnel and equipment moving through either the JTF 11 
military airhead in Palmerola or the commercial facilities at Toncontin 
Airport in Tegucigalpa and to coordinate any matters with the Honduran 
General Staff that may be required. The FAST, led by a captain with 
several experienced E7s/E8s, all fluent linguists, was attached to the 
USMILGP but authorized direct liaison with key Embassy staff (e.g., 
Chief of Station, USAID Coordinator, etc.) to represent the Group’s 
interests. This decision proved immeasurably productive, not only in 
support of the CREM and FOBs,51 but also for the many other SF MTTs 
and smaller-scale combined exercises that emerged in 1984, e.g., the Area 
Command Base/SFOD-As in Mocoron, Jutigalpa, Tamara and Mercala. 
While all this activity surrounding FOB 73’s missions was 
underway, the Group couldn’t afford to forget about the crucial issue of 
effectively sustaining the operational tempo. The troops at the CREM 
were on a 179-day rotational cycle; we were gearing up the second 
rotation back at Bragg to assume the mission from the first group. They 
were undergoing an intensive pre-deployment training and review cycle. 
Additionally, as soon as FOB 73 was out the gate and operational, 
SOUTHCOM generated another major requirement for a presence and 
training mission. The Group had fully anticipated that General Gorman 
                                                          
51 An additional FOB (FOB 72) was deployed to Palmerola in early 1984 to 
command and control similar combined exercises (individual and collective 
training) with Honduran battalions along the border areas of El 
Salvador/Honduras and the El Salvador/Honduras/Guatemala tri-border area. 
Much like its counterpart (FOB 73), FOB 72 had a strategic mission beyond the 
training mission.  




would want FOB 73 fully operational well beyond the life cycle of the 
AHAUS TARA II exercise and was planning on doing so, requiring that the 
troops there would have to rotate out no later than January 1984 in order to 
stay within the restraints of Army deployment policy. Army regulations at 
that time required that a soldier could not be deployed in a temporary duty 
status overseas for more than 179 consecutive days, unless deployed in 
declared hostilities. For all intents and purposes, we were at peace, not a 
state of declared hostilities, so we decided that we needed to establish a 
prudent rotation plan so that the guys could plan their lives with some 
degree of assuredness. Regardless of the nobility of that goal and how 
many times we revised the plan, we were constantly behind the eight-ball 
for one simple reason: The requirements emanating from SOUTHCOM 
kept expanding … sometimes small, sometimes large. There was no point, 
however, where we reached a “stop that one, in order to do a new one” 
stage; it was always “keep up what you’re doing and add this one.” 
AHAUS TARA III would immediately follow the AHAUS TARA II 
exercise and FOB 73 would roll along without skipping a beat. 
Additionally, however, there was another requirement—one that would 
require another FOB. This one would focus on combined exercises with 
Honduran Army units assigned in the western portion of the country, 
along the border areas of El Salvador/Honduras and the El 
Salvador/Honduras/Guatemala tri-border area. Much like its counterpart 
FOB 73, FOB 72, as we would designate it, had a strategic mission 
beyond the training mission. As Salvadoran military operations against the 
FMLN improved, the guerrillas began to seek the sanctuary of the 
contested border areas (bulsones) resulting from the 1969 Soccer War 
between El Salvador and Honduras. These five areas were essentially “no 
man’s lands” where neither the Salvadoran nor the Honduran military 
would enter to exert influence because of the fear that each would perceive 
such actions by the other as a violation of Organization of American States 
negotiated cease-fire that ended the war and the eventual peace treaty that 




both nations signed in 1980. The peace treaty left the adjudication of the 
status of the disputed border demarcation to the International Court of 
Justice, but at that time in 1983–84, the Court had not addressed the matter 
and it remained a sore point, particularly between the two militaries. With 
no sovereign force within the bulsones, the FMLN guerrillas had a secure 
safe haven—one where they could rest their forces, conduct training, stage 
and store resupplies, care for and rehabilitate their wounded, etc. Not only 
wouldn’t either the Honduran or Salvadoran military employ any ground 
forces into those areas, they both also proscribed any indirect fire 
(artillery, mortars) or aerial fire (from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft) 
into those zones. The results were camps within the bulsones, fully evident 
in overhead photography, operating with impunity and completely 
unchallenged. The hope was that SF trainers with the Honduran Battalions 
and the SF OPATTs with the Salvadoran brigades and cazadores could 
influence the extant military animosity sufficiently so that the countries’ 
militaries would cooperate in operations against the FMLN sanctuaries, 
under agreed-upon conditions … even if the U.S. SOF personnel had to 
act as the facilitators of that coordination and cooperation.  
Though the FOB 72 mission was not expected to launch until late 
1983 or early 1984, planning began in earnest in September 1983. One 
immediate wrinkle that was thrown into the mix by SOUTHCOM was an 
additional requirement for FOB 72 to provide secure compartmented 
intelligence support to the AHAUS TARA III Joint Task Force 
Headquarters that would be set up at Palmerola Air Base in Comayagua, 
Honduras. That wasn’t something that we’d expected. We surely 
anticipated we’d deploy FOB 72 with a SCIF capability, similar and 
compatible with that already cranking at FOB 73 so that it had 
connectivity to national intelligence systems, particularly the National 
Security Agency, but we envisioned basing FOB 72 near the town of 
Santa Rosa de Copan near the tri-border area, not in Palmerola, which was 
in a more centralized location within Honduras. To adjust we did as we 




were directed, placing components (to include the SCIF) of FOB 72 in 
Palmerola but positioned a large chunk of the staff and all the actual 
SFOD-As at the forward location near Santa Rosa de Copan, with the 
SFOD-As dispersed to the Honduran units they’d be operating with. One 
was designated FOB 72 (at Palmerola); the operational satellite was 
designated FOB 72X (at Santa Rosa). Just like some sort of amoeba, once 
FOB 72 launched the SF presence was all over the map of Honduras. 
 
One of the interesting dilemmas that the Group encountered 
throughout the Central America campaign was the difference in funding 
streams that applied to the different activities. There were fundamentally 
three distinct categories: 
 The CREM was a security assistance activity, which placed it 
under a distinct regulatory regime under the oversight of the 
Army’s security assistance structure. The funding of supplies and 
materials required certain accountability and billing procedures; 
also, the Group’s personnel who participated in the mission at the 
CREM were authorized a certain per diem since they were 
essentially a “mobile training team” … albeit not very mobile.  
 The Group’s personnel at the FOB locations (72, 72X, and 73), 
however, were under “field conditions” participating in combined 
exercises, so per diem wasn’t authorized. Any transfer of materials 
to their partnered Honduran units had to be justified as occurring 
only to ensure the attainment of the “U.S. training objectives.” 
This issue precipitated a number of audits and investigations as to 
whether such simple items as paper targets used by the Hondurans 
during marksmanship exercises should have been billed to the 
Honduran military rather than be provided from Group resources 
as an essential element to the attainment of the Group’s training 
objectives. The Group’s position was that the provision of key 
consumables within the context of the combined exercises 




contributed to the maintenance of our Foreign Internal Defense 
core tasks (individual and collective) such as area/language 
immersion, training techniques, etc.; moreover, the overarching 
objective of achieving a confident degree of interoperability with 
Honduran forces in order to support the Group’s ability to support 
combined operations that may be required by USSOUTHCOM in 
defense of Honduras or U.S. forces in-country. The concept of 
what became known as “Deployments for Training” (DFTs) 
eventually emerged and became a more acceptable practice. In 
later years (post-9/11), Congress granted specific authority to the 
Commander U.S. Special Operations Command to fund such 
activities with partner nations in support of the war on terror.  
 The FAST in Tegucigalpa was TDY with full per diem allowances 
to include lodging allowance. 
To achieve some degree of equity between the three, the Group 
also had to carefully manage the rotation of teams (and individuals) 
between the venues since assignment to each locale was compensated 
differently and the expectation was that the op tempo would not diminish 
in the foreseeable future.  
The implications to the overall Group budget were also profound, 
factoring in significantly increased blade hours; repair parts and resupply 
for the FOBs; increased TDY budgets for travels to theater for planning 
and briefings, etc.; increased training costs for language training (or 
refresher) for new personnel; and many other unforecasted requirements. 
The “peacetime” forecasts in 1982 had in no way anticipated what would 
occur in 1983 and 1984. This caused ripples within the overall 1st 
SOCOM budget, requiring the diversion of funds from other 1st SOCOM 
accounts to sustain the 7th SFGA operational requirements. The Group 
Comptroller became more and more a key participant in the internal 
operational planning process. 
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